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INTRODUCTION
The administration of Barack Obama has been marked by its stated quest
for transparency. On his first full day in office, President Obama signed the
Open Government Memorandum, declaring that he was "committed to creat-
ing an unprecedented level of openness in government" and that he aimed to
"promot[e] accountability and provid[e] information for citizens about what
their Government is doing."' Following this ambitious commitment, the Oba-
ma Administration engaged in a frenzy of transparency-related activities, bring-
ing to light thousands of data sets that contained previously unavailable infor-
mation in a wide variety of regulatory domains. Dozens of other countries have
enthusiastically followed the American example, vowing to release unprece-
dented amounts of regulatory information to the Internet.
The core purpose of these transparency initiatives was to strengthen the ac-
countability of governmental agencies and to ensure "that persons with public
responsibilities [are] answerable to 'the people' for the performance of their du-
ties."' Indeed, regulatory transparency has traditionally been regarded as a
means for improving agencies' public accountability.4 The advent of the Inter-
net era further buttresses this logic, creating unprecedented opportunities for
accessing, sharing, and processing regulatory information. This Article compli-
cates this traditional marriage between transparency, technology, and public
accountability.
The Article begins with a basic question: do existing online transparency
policies succeed in improving public accountability? To answer this question,
the Article develops an analytic typology composed of three different types of
1. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Open
Government Memorandum].
2. See OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP, http://www.opengovpartnership.org (last
visited Oct. 23, 2012).
3. Michael W. Dowdie, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic
Mappings, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGN, DILEMMAS AND ExPERIENCES 1, 3
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
4. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judi-
cial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 917 (2006) ("[Plopular accountability




online transparency policies. The first of these regimes is mandatory transparen-
cy, which refers to policies that oblige federal agencies to release specific catego-
ries of regulatory information. Examples include online notice and comment,
online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and online disclosure of
federal spending. The second regime is discretionary transparency, which refers
to policies that direct agencies to publish some information online but do not
specify what exactly should be released. This is the approach taken by Da-
ta.gov-the landmark Obama initiative that requires agencies to place online
"high-value" datasets of their choice. The final regime is involuntary transparen-
cy, which explores the regulatory response to whistleblowers and leaks.
Exploring the theoretical pillars of these models of online transparency as
well as their practical implementation, the Article argues that existing transpa-
rency policies do not actually strengthen public accountability. Far from being a
game-changer, the marriage of transparency and technology reinforces the tra-
ditional pitfalls of transparency policies. The current architecture of online
transparency allows agencies to retain control over regulatory data and thus
withhold information that is essential for public accountability purposes. It also
prioritizes quantity over quality of disclosures, and reinforces traditional bar-
riers of access to information. Hence, although public accountability is the rai-
son d'dtre of online transparency policies, these policies often fail to improve ac-
countability.
Technology should not be blamed, however, for this broken link between
transparency and public accountability. This Article argues that a more
nuanced institutional design of online transparency policies could successfully
overcome traditional challenges and strengthen public accountability. In order
to do so, a closer look should be given to the role of technology in the adminis-
trative state and its capacity to alter existing institutional structures. While the
introduction of technology alone cannot convince agencies to expose them-
selves to the public eye, a combination of supporting institutional provisions
and a more targeted reliance on technology could be valuable for accountability
purposes.
Accordingly, this Article suggests that the content of online transparency
policies-and not only their rhetoric-should focus on accountability-related
information. Agencies should be required to release structured information on
their decisionmaking processes and on their performance-the two categories
of information that are most pertinent for public accountability purposes.
Moreover, this transparency regime should be complemented by effective en-
forcement measures-a basic element that is surprisingly missing from the ar-
chitecture of regulatory transparency. The suggestions below provide an exten-
sive menu of potential enforcement techniques.
This Article also explores how civil society can use information released by
agencies to hold them accountable for their decisions, as well as what role the
Internet plays within this framework. Although these questions play a vital role
in designing any public accountability system, they have long been ignored by
the architects of transparency policies. The Article outlines two major mechan-
isms of public accountability: judicial oversight and public advocacy. It demon-
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strates that while the direct access of civil society to courts is limited, online
transparency policies can be vital for the public advocacy efforts of civil society,
with technology playing a key role in this endeavor.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I articulates the role of public account-
ability in administrative law, and explores the major "offline" policies that aim
to improve public accountability, such as notice and comment and FOIA. Part
II offers a typology of the three major regimes of online transparency policies,
and demonstrates that they largely fail in their efforts to strengthen public ac-
countability. Part III suggests an alternative design for online transparency poli-
cies, such as requiring agencies to release information on their decisionmaking
processes and performance. Part III also suggests improved enforcement mea-
sures, and discusses the mechanisms available to civil society for holding agen-
cies accountable. Part IV concludes.
I. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. Transparency and Public Accountability ofAdministrative Agencies
The accountability of administrative agencies to the general public is a
"hallmark of modern democratic governance."' The core of this concept is that
"persons with public responsibilities should be answerable to 'the people' for
the performance of their duties."6 Democracies should allow citizens to
"appreciably influence the direction of government, and ... have an opportuni-
ty to assess progress and assign blame."7 Democracy, according to this vision,
"remains a paper procedure if those in power cannot be held accountable in
public for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, their policies, and their
expenditures."'
Public accountability consists of two components: the explanation and jus-
tification of agencies' activities to the public; and an accompanying mechanism
for public sanctions. Accordingly, an institutional design for public accounta-
bility should be grounded in an explanatory requirement (ensuring that agen-
cies explain and justify their actions), and a punitive element (providing ave-
nues for public assessment of agencies' actions and appropriate responses). As
the public cannot vote agency officials out of office, potential punishments in-
5. Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT 182, 182 (Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn & Christopher Pollitt eds.,
2007); see also Glen Staszewski, Reason Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1253, 1254 (2009) ("Modern public law is strongly devoted to the notion that
public officials should be held 'accountable' for their decisions.").
6. Dowdle, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Samaha, supra note 4, at 916.
8. Bovens, supra note 5, at 182; see also Samaha, supra note 4, at 916 ("Democracies
promise responsiveness and accountability to popular will, rather than claim obe-




clude changes in regulatory policy or, in more extreme cases, changes in per-
sonnel.9 While this structure may appear simple and intuitive, its practical im-
plementation has thus far been highly complex and problematic.
The demand for public accountability of administrative agencies is primar-
ily satisfied through regulatory transparency."o Public accountability has been
inseparably linked to transparency; and transparency is routinely regarded as a
necessary precondition of accountability." A range of public figures, both his-
toric and contemporary, have amply supported this view. James Madison, for
example, famously noted that a "popular government, without popular infor-
mation, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both."" Justice Brandeis stated that "[s]unlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." President Obama
himself stated that a "democracy requires accountability, and accountability re-
quires transparency." 4 Throughout American history, it has been well unders-
tood that "[diemocracies die behind closed doors,"" and that "[t]o be held ac-
countable and to perform well, [government] must be visible to the public.""
9. The changes introduced in the Torture Memoranda of the Bush Administration
are one possible example of such developments. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TER-
ROR PRESIDENCY 141-176 (2007).
1o. See Dowdle, supra note 3, at 5-6. On the prevalence of transparency discourse, see
Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339,
1340-42. For a discussion of the general benefits of transparency in government,
see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895-902
(20o6).
11. See, e.g., Open Government Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4685 ("Transparency
promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their
Government is doing."); ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: IN-
STITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 182 (2007) ("Transparency is necessary for ac-
countability, and helps to promote impartiality by suppressing self-interested offi-
cial behavior."); Fenster, supra note io, at goo ("[Transparency] enables the free
flow of information among public agencies and private individuals, allowing in-
put, review, and criticism of government action, and thereby increases the quality
of governance."); Schauer, supra note io, at 1346 ("Foremost among [the aims of
transparency], at least in much of contemporary discourse, is what is commonly
described as 'accountability."').
12. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
13. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Thoemmes Press 2003) (1914).
14. Freedom of Information Act: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter FOIA Memo-
randum].
15. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
16. Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617,
619 (2010); see also Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What
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There are, of course, several problems with this assumption. First, the gen-
eral call for regulatory transparency rarely defines the precise contours of the
desired transparency policy. Even the most basic questions about regulatory
transparency-what types of regulatory information should be made public,
how this information should be presented, and how the potential pitfalls of
transparency should be avoided' 7-are often left unanswered by the fuzzy gen-
eralities of many transparency regimes. Second, it is not clear to what extent
current transparency policies actually enhance public accountability. As this Ar-
ticle demonstrates, existing transparency policies often fail to explain and justify
agencies' actions. Furthermore, even if the explanatory elements of public ac-
countability are fulfilled, transparency alone cannot elicit the type of public
outcry that would compel an agency to change its course of action. The fact that
transparency is a necessary, but insufficient, requirement for public account-
ability is often overlooked by policymakers, and transparency is pursued for its
own sake.
The next sections of this Article illustrate these observations in detail, dis-
cussing the failure of several offline transparency policies to improve public ac-
countability. The Article then discusses how a similar problem plagues online
transparency policies.
B. Notice and Comment on Proposed Regulation
Despite the prevalence of accountability rhetoric in modern politics, the
concept of public accountability for administrative agencies has not always been
a part of the American legal system. It emerged as a result of the opposition of
industry groups to the insulated administrative culture of the New Deal. " These
groups did not have a say on rules that affected their interests. Until 1935, agen-
cies were not even required to publish regulations that they adopted or to pro-
Works, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 399, 399 (2009) ("[T]he free flow of information
to interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the
deliberative process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable.");
Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Em-
pirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 100
(2011) ("Open government and equal access to decisionmaking processes are cor-
nerstones that ensure an accountable and democratically legitimate Fourth
Branch.").
17. The main arguments against regulatory transparency are that it is costly, that it
impedes law enforcement and security objectives, and that it inhibits "the ability
of government officials to deliberate over policy matters. .. without the inevitable
pressure that accompanies public scrutiny." Fenster, supra note io, at 908.
18. See William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law-
Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 178 (2009). Funk notes
that the "personnel and culture of the agencies were hostile to business" and that




vide public access to their records. 9 Frustrated business groups pressured Con-
gress to protect private interests affected by regulation by imposing on agencies
requirements of transparency and public participation.2 0
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)"' represented the first step
toward a more comprehensive scheme of public accountability. 2 The "notice
and comment" procedure was a major innovation of the Act, allowing the pub-
lic to comment on proposed rules and obliging agencies to include in final rules
an explanation of their basis and purpose.2 3 Although the original scope of this
procedure was narrow, 4 it transformed administrative law for decades to come.
Citizen participation in rulemaking became "one of the most fundamental, im-
portant, and far-reaching democratic rights."" Nonetheless, the APA has largely
failed to keep administrative agencies accountable.
As part of the notice and comment procedure, the APA requires agencies
engaged in rulemaking to provide a "general notice" of the proposed rule and
invite the public to comment on it. 26 While the Act only refers to a minimal no-
tice, judicial interpretation expanded its terms, instructing agencies to explain
the different data and considerations that underlie the proposed rule.2 7 Follow-
ing the notice and comment period, agencies must consider public comments
and "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
19. Id. at 172-73.
20. Id. at 178.
21. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
22. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 472 (explaining that the APA "in-
tended overall to guard against overreaching or unfair regulation by providing af-
fected parties increased hearing and participation rights").
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012).
24. See Funk, supra note 18, at 173-75 (discussing "the history of the development of
public participation and transparency in administrative law"); M. Elizabeth Ma-
gill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1432 (2004).
25. Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
517 (2004).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). The notice shall include "(1) a statement of the time, place,
and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority
under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved." Id. § 553(b).
27. See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.3d 1554, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring the FCC to
respond to significant comments); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp.,
568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring the FDA to disclose scientific data);
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requir-
ing the EPA to disclose findings that underlay the proposed rule).
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and purpose."" In so doing, agencies have to explain their policy choices. 9 In
theory, then, this framework fully corresponds to the justification component
of public accountability.
Although courts demanded that agencies "infuse[] the administrative
process with the degree of openness, explanation, and participatory democracy
required by the APA,"3o the notice and comment process has hardly met these
high expectations. In fact, the procedure has drawn substantial criticism from
various directions. While the primary goal of the process had been to funnel
public input into agency decisionmaking, "very few ordinary citizens have
availed themselves of this opportunity."" Meaningful participation requires
thorough knowledge and expertise in the regulated field, coupled with sizeable
resources and the motivation to persuade the agency in favor of one's position.
Most citizens do not fit this description, and agencies are not required to active-
ly encourage participation or solicit comments from underrepresented stake-
holders. Hence, notice and comment is typically dominated by a limited num-
ber of high-caliber professional interest groups and industry representatives,
who possess the resources and the expertise necessary to file persuasive com-
ments.32
Furthermore, even if citizens do participate in the notice and comment
procedure, agencies do not necessarily answer to them. While a considerable
share of public comments involves normative judgments and questions related
to policy priorities, agencies are reluctant to publicly address such comments."
An empirical study demonstrates that agencies spend the bulk of their time res-
ponding to the most sophisticated comments-those that articulate complex
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
29. See Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
("We do not expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in
the submissions made to it in informal rule making. We do expect. . . to see what
major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the
agency reacted to them as it did.").
30. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1on, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
31. Cary Coglianese, Expanding Regulatory Pluralism: The Role of Information Tech-
nology in Rulemaking 7 (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. and Int'l Affairs Working Paper, 2005),
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/coglianese.pdf; see Wendy E. Wagner,
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321,
1382, 1386 (2010); Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 16, at 108-119.
32. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006); Scott Furlong & Cornelius Kerwin, Interest Group
Participation in Rulemaking: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 353 (2005); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 98 J. POL. 128
(2oo6).
33. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.




technical concerns and are typically submitted by organized groups. 4 But agen-
cies "appear to be impatient with and unresponsive to" policy or value-laden
reasons and concerns found in public comments, even if the volume of these
comments is large."
If the goal of notice and comment is to satisfy the explanatory requirement
of public accountability, this tendency is naturally worrisome. First, as broad
citizen participation is hindered by barriers of expertise, resources, and motiva-
tion, agencies avoid the necessity to respond to public queries. Second, even if
asked, agencies are reluctant to meaningfully explain their rulemaking priorities
and normative preferences. Although the notice and comment process was en-
visioned as a landmark of public accountability, it has nonetheless evolved into
a system that is widely considered inaccessible and nontransparent.
C. Freedom ofInformation
The APA was part of the first wave of public accountability legislation,
spurred by groups seeking to protect private interests affected by administrative
rulemaking. The second wave was mostly concerned with the public interest. 6
It arrived in the wake of public discontent with the Vietnam War and the Wa-
tergate scandal, representing "a revolution against the establishment" and ex-
pressing "a grave distrust of those in power."3 Several statutes that reflected this
sentiment were enacted between 1966 and 1978. The primary piece of legislation,
the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,3' aimed to "ensure an informed citi-
34. Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 414-15 (2005).
35. Mendelson, supra note 33, at 1363-64, 1367 (noting that "rulemaking documents
only occasionally acknowledge the number of lay comments and the sentiments
they express; they very rarely appear to give them any significant weight"); see also
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Politi-
cal Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 908 (2006) (analyzing the FCC's rulemaking on
media ownership and noting that the "overwhelming sentiment against the rules
in the comments appears to have had no effect").
36. Funk, supra note 18, at 180.
37. Id. at 178; see also Dowdle, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing the causes for the "open
government" movement in the United States and Britain).
38. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2012)). Two other significant laws of this period are the Government in the Sun-
shine Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. i241 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)), which obliged multi-member agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission to open their meetings to the public, and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 77o (codified at 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 2), which aimed to open for public scrutiny the advisory committees operated
by administrative agencies. See Funk, supra note 18, at 183-91; Steven P. Croley &
William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 451, 456 (1997); Carolyn Bingham Kello, Note, Drawing the Cur-
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zenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." 9 However,
as with notice and comment, the rhetoric of FOIA has not resulted in robust
public accountability outcomes. Instead, the release of governmental records
has come to depend on a variety of contingencies.
The operating principle of FOIA is straightforward: all governmental
records shall be made available upon public request, unless specifically ex-
empted. 4o The Act grants "any person" the right to seek information, 41 thus es-
tablishing a "strong presumption in favor of disclosure."4 ' As part of this, FOIA
requires agencies to publish certain types of information in the Federal Regis-
ter,4 1 instructs them to proactively release some other categories of informa-
tion,44 and offers the public a right to ask for governmental information that
has not been otherwise published.45
Despite these ambitious prescriptions, FOIA has been subject to criticism
since its enactment. The latest FOIA amendment, the OPEN Government Act
of 2007, acknowledged that "in practice, the [FOIA] has not always lived up to
[its] ideals."46 A major weakness of FOIA has been its failure to impose affirma-
tain on Open Government? In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 345, 346-47 (2003).
39. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978); see also Dowdle, su-
pra note 3, at 6 (explaining that FOIA's goal was "to allow a much wider range of
civil society to hold public officials to account even without directly participating
in political decisionmaking").
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(b). A record is broadly defined to include information stored
on any form of media. Id. § 552(f); see David C. Vladeck, Information Access-
Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-To-Know Acts, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1787, 1797 n.66 (2008).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
42. U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991); see also Vladeck, supra note 40,
at 1796 (noting that FOIA established a "presumption of open access to all records
in the hands of the federal government").
43. The information that ought to be published includes "substantive rules of general
applicability," "statements of general policy or interpretations of general applica-
bility formulated and adopted by the agency," and descriptions of the agency's or-
ganization. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). This information includes "final opinions [and] ... orders,
made in the adjudication of cases," "statements of general policy and interpreta-
tions which have been adopted by the agency," and "administrative staff manuals
and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public." Id.; see infra text ac-
companying notes 101-107.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3).




tive disclosure duties on agencies. 47 FOIA is fully "requester driven": agencies
release information in response to a public request. 4 As a result, the burden to
obtain records falls on the shoulders of the requester. Instead of facilitating this
process, agencies often attempt to hinder it. Indeed, "[t]o press a recalcitrant
administration for disclosure under FOIA requires time, money, and exper-
tise." 49 The effectiveness of FOIA therefore depends on professional and
well-funded intermediaries-most often the media, public interest groups, and
non-governmental organizations."o These intermediaries are necessary to over-
come FOIA's substantial time and cost barriers. But even more importantly,
they are needed because FOIA requests require some degree of prerequisite
knowledge; indeed, one must know exactly what to ask for and how to ask for it
before filing a request. Such prerequisite knowledge is naturally the domain of a
limited number of professional intermediaries who handle the majority of
FOIA requests." Although they can be effective in bringing to light governmen-
tal information, full reliance on these intermediaries is problematic because
they are often "subject to the vicissitudes of public opinion, the need to remain
on good terms with government sources, and the demands of competing priori-
ties for their resources.""
Malleability is another "perennial problem"" and a notable feature of
FOIA. Each presidential administration may obligate agencies to process infor-
mation requests according to its own interpretation of the Act. The administra-
tion of George W. Bush, for example, instructed agencies to deny information
47. See Michael Herz, Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Informa-
tion, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 577, 584 (20o8).
48. Vladeck, supra note 40, at 1789 (referring to this problem as "FOIA's Achilles'
heel").
49. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency,
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008).
5o. The "most effective requesters" include the National Security Archives, the ACLU,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
the Center for Constitutional Rights, Judicial Watch, and the Center for National
Security Studies. Id. at 1024.
51. A related concern is that, at times, prerequisite knowledge is simply unavailable to
entities outside the government. As Donald Rumsfeld famously noted, "[t]here
are things we don't know we don't know.... And each year, we discover a few
more of those unknown unknowns." Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def.,
Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium (June 6, 2002),
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3490. When no
one outside the government is aware of such "unknown unknowns," FOIA be-
comes irrelevant. In such cases, only insider whistleblowers can make information
public. For a comprehensive analysis, see David Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 257 (2010).
52. Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1023.
53. Vladeck, supra note 40, at 1790.
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requests whenever a "sound legal basis" was available.5 4 True to his campaign
promises, President Obama revoked that policy on his first day in office. Oba-
ma's FOIA memorandum stated that "[all agencies should adopt a presump-
tion in favor of disclosure," and that this presumption "should be applied to all
decisions involving FOIA."5
While the Bush Administration's presumption of secrecy was swiftly
adopted by agencies, the effects of Obama's FOIA policy have been uneven. A
survey conducted in March 2010, one year after the issuance of Obama's FOIA
memorandum, revealed that less than fifteen percent of agencies to which the
memorandum applied "had actually made concrete changes in their FOIA pro-
cedures."" Following pressure by the media and the White House, the number
of complying agencies rose to fifty-five percent by March 2011.1 But a closer
look reveals that the traditional problems of FOIA persist: "Long backlogs of
requests for information, along with responses that take a year or more, are
common."58
President Obama himself has noted that FOIA, "which encourages ac-
countability through transparency, is the most prominent expression of a pro-
found national commitment to ensuring an open Government." 9 However, the
composite of exemptions, delays, costs, expertise, and administration-
dependent interpretations has generated a gap between freedom of information
on the books and freedom of information in action. Transparency cannot inde-
pendently promote public accountability in such conditions, as it depends on a
combination of experienced intermediaries, cooperative administrations, and
supportive courts. In some cases, this combination materializes and govern-
mental records are released. In other cases, one or more of these elements is
missing and FOIA's transparency and public accountability model fails.
In sum, the major vehicles for public accountability for administrative
agencies-notice and comment on proposed regulation and FOIA-have fallen
short of expectations. Notice and comment has failed to engage the public in
the regulatory process and prompt agencies to provide meaningful explanations
for their choices and priorities. The implementation of FOIA has been similarly
54. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., to the Heads of All Fed.
Dep'ts & Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/ashcroft.html.
55. FOIA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 4683.
56. Glass Half Full: Knight Open Government Survey 2011, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE 3
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB338
/KnightOpenGovtSurvey2on.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Natasha Singer, How To Break an Information Bottleneck, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/o6/26business/26stream.html.




unsatisfactory from a public accountability perspective, as the release of gov-
ernmental records has come to depend on a variety of contingencies.
II. THE ONLINE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIc AccoUNTA-
BILITY
Scholars have celebrated the potential of the Internet to open new channels
of communication between citizens and the government, overcome agencies'
resistance to exposure, and begin a new chapter in the long story of regulatory
transparency and public accountability."o Despite these high aspirations, the
current architecture of online transparency policies has not managed to avoid
the traditional pitfalls of offline transparency policies: barriers to information
access and agencies' resistance to exposure. In fact, both the design and the im-
plementation of online transparency policies have been flawed and have largely
failed to promote true public accountability. While the quantity of available
regulatory information has increased exponentially, the quality and utility of
that information has not considerably improved. As this Part shows, online
transparency policies allow agencies to retain control over regulatory informa-
tion, letting them decide what, when, and in what form information will be re-
leased to the public. Thus, the introduction of technology often seems to have
only marginal effects on agencies' public accountability.
The following pages provide a background on the current architecture of
online transparency policies. This Part then suggests a three-part typology of
online transparency policies, and examines the contribution of these policies to
the public accountability of administrative agencies.
The rapid development of information technologies since the mid-199os
has spurred the effort to enhance the public accountability of administrative
agencies and cure the deficiencies of existing accountability mechanisms.
The first attempts to introduce technology into administrative proceedings
sought to improve agencies' internal management and the provision of public
services. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, for example, required the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to employ information technology as a
means "to improve the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of Federal
60. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 212-72 (2006); BRUCE BIMBER,
INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLUTION OF
POLITICAL POWER (2003); ANDREW CHADWICK, INTERNET POLITICS: STATES, CIT-
IZENS, AND NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (2006); STEPHEN COLEMAN &
JAY G. BLUMLER, THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THEORY, PRAC-
TICE AND POLICY (2009); DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL
RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004); HOWARD RHEIN-
GOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER (MIT Press 2000) (1993); A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003); Jennifer
Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in Ameri-
ca, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413 (2011).
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programs."' The Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998 directed
agencies to use, when practicable, electronic forms, filings, and signatures to
improve their service provision to the public."2 As part of the effort to increase
agencies' transparency, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996
(E-FOIA)63 instructed agencies to place online frequently requested FOIA
records. The E-Government Act of 2002 continued that course of action, direct-
ing federal agencies to enhance the volume of public records available online
and adopt standards for improved organization and categorization of regulato-
ry information.4 Other initiatives of this period targeted federal spending and
required agencies to generate comprehensive online datasets that contained in-
formation on federal contracts, grants, and awards. 5
While the roots of online transparency policies are found in the Clinton
and Bush Administrations, these policies have become much more prominent
during Barack Obama's presidency. On his first full day in office, President
Obama signed two major policy documents: the Transparency and Open Gov-
ernment Memorandum and the Freedom of Information Act Memorandum. 6
The Open Government Memorandum declared that the Obama Administration
"is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government,"
and that it aims to "promote[] accountability and provide[] information for cit-
izens about what their Government is doing."61 The FOIA memorandum was
similarly determined, suggesting that FOIA "should be administered with a
61. Pub. Law No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163, 167 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h)(5)
(2012)).
62. Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XVII, § 1702, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §
3504).
63. Pub. L. No. 101-231, 11o Stat. 347 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
64. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of5,
10, 13, 15, 18, 28, 31, 40, 41, and 44 U.S.C.). The Act defines "electronic govern-
ment" as "the use by the Government of web-based Internet applications and oth-
er information technologies... to enhance the access to and delivery of govern-
ment information and services to the public." Id. § ioi(a), u6 Stat. at 2902. The
Act specifies the information that ought to appear on agencies' websites and sets
"minimum agency goals to assist public users to navigate agency websites." Id. §
207(f)(B), 116 Stat. at 2918.
65. On federal spending transparency, see discussion infra Subsection II.A.3. On open
data, see discussion infra Section II.B.
66. Open Government Memorandum, supra note 1; FOIA Memorandum, supra note
14.




clear presumption" in favor of openness. 68 The Internet has been envisioned as
a major catalyst of these developments.9
President Obama's two memoranda and the efforts of the previous admin-
istrations to digitize administrative proceedings laid the groundwork for the ex-
isting architecture of online transparency and public accountability. These poli-
cies, in turn, can be divided into three major categories: mandatory
transparency, discretionary transparency, and involuntary transparency. An
analysis of these three categories sheds light on the role of transparency in the
administrative state, and illuminates the effects of online transparency policies
on the public accountability of administrative agencies. The analysis below also
explores the extent to which the introduction of the Internet may help over-
come agencies' resistance to openness, lower participation barriers, and ulti-
mately translate transparency into public accountability-a challenge that often
proved insurmountable in the pre-Internet era.
A. Mandatory Transparency
Mandatory transparency refers to policies that obligate agencies to place
specific types of information online. This concept can serve as an effective
transparency mechanism, as it removes agency discretion to decide which in-
formation should be publicly disclosed. Mandatory disclosure disciplines agen-
cies, prevents regulatory capture, and limits the corrupting power of improper
influences. Since agency decisions are publicly scrutinized in this regime, pro-
ponents of mandatory transparency expect that agencies subject to mandatory
transparency would be less inclined to shirk their obligations or engage in du-
bious activities.
Although mandatory transparency policies have always been common in
administrative law, the advent of the Internet led to a quantitative and qualita-
tive shift in their implementation. Agencies can now make much more infor-
mation available to many more individuals at significantly lower costs. The link
between transparency and accountability is expected to be particularly strong in
this context. First, agencies can be forced to explain and justify a larger range of
their decisions to a substantially wider online audience. Second, public scrutiny
and sanctions become easier since one does not have to examine the physical
copies of the Federal Register in order to inspect agencies' decisions. Instead, it
becomes possible to browse an agency's website and retrieve the desired infor-
mation within seconds. The information on an agency's website can then be
used in courts, or conveyed to the media and the executive and legislative
branches of government. These actors, in turn, can use that information to in-
fluence the agency's behavior.
68. FOIA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 4683.
69. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and
Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 535 (2009).
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The following Sections discuss three major policies of online mandatory
transparency. Two of these-online notice and comment and online FOIA-
seek to cure the public accountability deficiencies of their offline counterparts.
The third-federal spending transparency-is a new development that takes
advantage of the opportunities created by the Internet. This Section will show
that the design and implementation of all three of these policies have largely
been flawed. In all three cases, the agencies' transparency mandate is either in-
sufficiently "mandatory" or inapplicable to the categories of information that
would truly contribute to public accountability.
I. Online Notice and Comment
In hopes of improving public engagement in rulemaking, the federal gov-
ernment has been interested in the "computerization of rulemaking dockets"
since the beginning of the 1990s.7 0 Accordingly, a major part of the
e-government effort of the Clinton and Bush Administrations addressed rule-
making. The E-Government Act required agencies to place their official rule-
making dockets online to the extent practicable and to accept electronic com-
ments from the public.71
The premise of the early e-rulemaking experiments of the Clinton Admin-
istration was that the introduction of information technology would enhance
public participation and improve the transparency of the rulemaking process.72
Citizens interested in commenting on proposed rules would no longer need to
travel in order to visit records repositories. Comments would be e-mailed to
agencies and posted on their websites, notices would be made searchable, and
voluminous documents would be easily linked to each other.73 The Bush Ad-
ministration enthusiastically expanded the e-rulemaking initiative, making it
"one of its governmental reform priorities."7 4 As part of this reform effort, the
Administration launched the government-wide web portal Regulations.gov,
which allows the public to view and submit electronic comments on proposed
70. Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.o, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 399 (2on).
71. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915-16 (co-
dified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)).
72. Coglianese, supra note 32, at 945-46; see Steven J. Balla & Benjamin M. Daniels,
Information Technology and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations, 1 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 46, 47 (2007); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rule-
makers' Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 454 (2010).
73. Lubbers, supra note 72, at 453-54.
74. Coglianese, supra note 32, at 946. For a history of the federal e-Rulemaking Initia-
tive, see Committee on the Status and Future of Federal E-Rulemaking, Achieving
the Potential: The Future of Federal E-Rulemaking, AM. BAR Ass'N 21-24 (2008),
http://www.resource.org/change.gov/ceri-report-web-version.fixed.pdf [hereinaf-




rules.7 An online docket management system that accompanies the portal is
supposed to serve as a common repository for the records of all administrative
agencies.' By 2012, Regulations.gov was serving more than 170 federal entities
that engage in rulemaking.7"
The initial reaction of both government officials and legal academics to the
e-rulemaking developments was enthusiastic. Commentators declared that the
Internet "changes everything" by encouraging citizens to "play a more central
role in the development of new agency policies and rules." 7 Some envisioned
the e-rulemaking effort as a trigger for a more interactive and deliberative rule-
making process, including online chat rooms and deliberative dialogues.7 1
However, as time passed, the effects of technology on citizen participation failed
to meet these optimistic predictions. Neither of the two expressed goals of
e-rulemaking-citizen participation and transparency-has been fully satisfied.
Although Regulations.gov has been active for almost a decade, it has not
enticed citizens to take a more active role in the rulemaking process.so While
some rules drew an unprecedented number of public comments,"' the Internet
has hardly changed the traditional patterns and biases of citizen participation."
This should not be surprising: while e-rulemaking reduces the costs of accessing
75. For a comprehensive analysis of the portal, see Committee on E-Rulemaking, su-
pra note 74.
76. Coglianese, supra note 32, at 946.
77. See Participating Agencies, REGULTIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/docs
/ParticipatingAgencies.pdf (last updated June 2012); Cynthia R. Farina, Achieving
the Potential: The Future of Federal E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 101-02
(2010).
78. E.g., Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50
ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 277, 303 (1998); see Committee on E-Rulemaking, supra note
74, at 7.
79. See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY
L.J. 433, 502-05 (2004); Thomas C. Beierle, Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rule-
making and Democratic Deliberation 6-15 (Resources for the Future, Discussion
Paper No. 03-22, 2003), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-03-2.pdf.
80. Curiously, agency officials do not consider Regulations.gov to be cost effective
either. See Lubbers, supra note 72, at 474.
81. For instance, more than a quarter of a million comments addressed the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's rulemaking on organic foods. Hundreds of thousands of
comments were directed to the Federal Communications Commission with re-
gard to its rulemaking on the concentration of ownership of media outlets. See
Coglianese, supra note 31, at 7; see also Mendelson, supra note 33, at 1361 (citing,
among other examples, a Clinton Administration tobacco rule that generated over
700,000 comments and a Fish and Wildlife Service rule relating to the listing of
polar bears as a threatened species that received over 640,000 comments).
82. Coglianese, supra note 31, at 7.
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records and submitting comments, it does not diminish the traditional barriers
to citizen participation." These barriers-professional expertise in the subject
matter, motivation, and resources to translate knowledge into substantive
comments-deter civil society from meaningful participation in notice and
comment, with or without the Internet.1 Hence, even if the sheer number of
participants grows, this does not necessarily imply that a broader range of inter-
ests is being represented in the rulemaking process.8 5
Nor have the transparency aspirations of e-rulemaking met original expec-
tations. A robust policy of online transparency would require agencies to pro-
vide full information on the statute that authorizes the agency's rule, disclose
administrative records related to the rule, post public comments and the agen-
cy's responses, explain the final rule, and detail the developments that followed
its adoption (court decisions, amendments, interpretations, and guidelines)."6
Ideally, this information would be available in a user-friendly format and would
be periodically updated. This idyllic scenario, however, is far from the reality.
The interface of Regulations.gov proved difficult to navigate. Moreover, the
quality, completeness, and timeliness of rulemaking materials posted by agen-
cies have been uneven.1 And although Regulations.gov was launched as a cen-
tralized system for e-rulemaking, it still allows agencies to set their own prac-
tices and priorities for the online notice and comment process." This early
choice of design has resulted in a lack of interagency "harmonization on such
essential elements as (i) what agencies call key rulemaking documents; (ii) what
information about these documents ('metadata') is supplied during data entry;
and (iii) what kinds of documents and metadata will be made available for re-
83. Id.; see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 111 (3d ed. 2003).
84. In fact, sophisticated knowledge is required even to navigate the different
e-rulemaking websites. For studies that demonstrate the sophistication and time
required to find rulemaking information on Regulations.gov, see Coglianese, su-
pra note 31, at 8-n; and Stuart Shapiro & Cary Coglianese, First Generation
E-Rulemaking: An Assessment of Regulatory Agency Websites (U. of Penn. Law Sch.,
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-15, 2007).
85. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 31. This is particularly true in cases where high
numbers of comments originate from mass e-mail campaigns concocted by public
or private interest groups. See, e.g., Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation?
Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-Gov'T 41, 58
(20o6). But see Mendelson, supra note 33, at 1361 (arguing that mass e-mail cam-
paigns can convey helpful content to the agency).
86. Lubbers, supra note 72, at 454.
87. See, e.g., Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other
Tools for Strengthening Our Civic Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1451-55
(2003); Stuart W. Shulman, E-rulemaking: Issues in Current Research and Practice,
28 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 621, 632-33 (2005).




view by the public."'9 Taking advantage of this decentralized structure, agencies
have retained full and undisputed control over the content of their dockets on
Regulations.gov. They have full discretion to decide which evidence is presented
in support of a proposed rule and which documents are left hidden from the
public eye.
Furthermore, both official records and public comments submitted
through the website require agency approval before appearing online,"o and
some public comments are being filtered out from the website without explana-
tion.91 Moreover, users outside the agency cannot assess "the nature or extent of
material in the rulemaking record that is missing from the electronic docket."92
Agencies still "own" their data and fiercely resist losing control over it.93
The ability of Regulations.gov to enhance public accountability is further
undermined by the fact that it was designed solely by federal agencies, without
involvement of potential nongovernmental users of the platform and with in-
sufficient attention to the particular needs and capacities of these users.94
Funding presents another difficulty. E-rulemaking endeavors have been
sponsored through existing agency budgets, forcing agencies to divert funds
from their other projects. Hence, agencies have been reluctant to allocate con-
siderable funds to the e-rulemaking system, supporting "only those features
that seem obviously worthwhile to their own operations."95
This reality has broad implications for the public accountability of adminis-
trative agencies. First, the assumption that the mere introduction of new tech-
nological tools and improved docket accessibility will transform the transpar-
ency of rulemaking, overcome agencies' resistance to openness, and invigorate
public participation has not held. The Regulations.gov design was insufficiently
specific and detailed, and therefore allowed a system that was technically man-
datory to become dependent on agencies' discretion. As the system can be
tweaked by agencies according to their internal priorities and preferences, its
89. Id.
90. Id. at 107. The Committee on the Status and Future of E-Rulemaking notes that
"[t]here appears to be a significant amount of material-including comments
submitted online-that agencies do not make accessible online to the public and
other agencies." Committee on E-Rulemaking, supra note 74, at 13. The absence of
certain materials is usually explained by copyright, sensitivity of personal infor-
mation, or confidentiality of business information. Id.
91. Committee on E-Rulemaking, supra note 74, at 18.
92. Id. at 13.
93. Id. at 26.
94. Farina, supra note 77, at 284-85.
95. Id. at 284.
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outputs cannot be regarded as fully reliable and trustworthy.9' The explanation
and justification elements of public accountability, therefore, remain unful-
filled. If coupled with a more nuanced institutional design,97 e-rulemaking may
certainly improve the notice and comment process. But so far, its effects on the
public accountability of administrative agencies have been relatively negligible.
2. Online Freedom of Information
Similar difficulties persist in the FOIA context. The lack of affirmative dis-
closure obligations has been recognized as a major weakness of the Act.9' Be-
cause it is request driven, FOIA's efficacy depends on professional interme-
diaries who have to file a request, wait to receive the records, and litigate if the
request is rejected. Only successful cases force public disclosure of the informa-
tion. Aware of these difficulties, Congress chose in 1996 to adopt an online ex-
tension to FOIA."9 This extension, called E-FOIA, sought to harness the power
of the Internet to solve the problems that prevented FOIA from resulting in
genuine agency accountability.
E-FOIA aims to lower the threshold for information requests and enable
"FOIA resources to be more efficiently used."' E-FOIA addresses three prima-
ry issues. First, it requires agencies to publish online copies of records they have
released pursuant to prior FOIA requests, as well as information that is "likely
to become the subject of subsequent requests."' The reading groups should
include four categories of records: "final opinions [and] orders, made in the ad-
judication of cases," "statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency," "administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff
that affect a member of the public," and records that are or will likely become
the subject of subsequent requests.'0 2 The addition of the latter to the inventory
96. Id. (noting that "searches [on Regulations.gov] will produce results that are unre-
liable in ways that public users are unlikely to realize and cannot, in any event,
control").
97. The Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative, for example, has been experimenting with a
variety of pilots that can improve the original design of the system, collaborating
in particular with the Department of Transportation. See Farina et al., supra note
70, at 411-16 (discussing the Regulation Room pilot with the Department of
Transportation).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
99. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 101-231,
no Stat. 347 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
oo. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at n1 (1996).





is particularly important because of the "requester-driven" nature of FOIA.o3
Without the publication of frequently requested records, FOIA requesters
would not know that the information has already been released and would ask
for the same records over and over again, wasting their own time and resources
(and those of the agency). The second innovation of E-FOIA is a requirement
that agencies "make reasonable efforts" to maintain and release records in elec-
tronic formats,o 4 thus preparing the ground for a full digitalization of FOIA re-
quests.o' Lastly, E-FOIA seeks to overturn "[t]he three-decade long history of
agency delay in processing requests for records,""' requiring an expedited
processing in cases where the requester "demonstrates a compelling need."o 7
The public accountability premises of these provisions are intuitive:
E-FOIA compels agencies to provide civil society with better and more accessi-
ble information on their decisions and activities, according to public needs and
interests. But even though E-FOIA was intended to be easily implemented,
agencies have "by and large failed to comply with E-FOIA's affirmative disclo-
sure mandate."'s A survey conducted ten years after E-FOIA came into force
found "massive non-compliance" among 149 administrative agencies.'0o Only
twenty-one percent of the surveyed agencies had on their websites all four cate-
gories of records (even if only partially),"0 and more than forty percent of agen-
cies had not posted even one frequently requested record."' Agencies are still
103. For a discussion of the "requester-driven" nature of FOIA, see supra text accom-
panying notes 47-52.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B)-(C).
105. This amendment was necessary as agencies tended to print out "boxes of listings
and charge[] thousands of dollars for the paper." The Freedom of Information Act:
Ensuring Transparency and Accountability in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 81-82 (2011) (statement of Sarah Cohen,
Knight Professor of the Practice of Journalism, Duke University) [hereinafter Co-
hen Testimony].
106. Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the "Mother of All Complaints:" Information De-
livery and Delay Reduction, 5o ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 345 (1998). E-FOIA aimed to
"tackle the mother of all complaints lodged against the Freedom of Information
Act: that is, the often ludicrous amount of time it takes some agencies to respond,
if they respond at all, to freedom of information requests." 142 CONG. REC.
Ho,451 (daily ed. Sep. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Horn).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (E) (i) (I).
108. Vladeck, supra note 40, at 1789.
109. File Not Found: io Years After E-FOIA, Most Federal Agencies Are Delinquent,
NAT'L SEc. ARCHIVE 1 (2007), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivNSAEBB/NSAEBB
216/e-foia-audit-brief.pdf.
110. Id. at 7-9.
111. Id. at 9.
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reluctant to provide records in open data formats."' Moreover, even agencies
that do publish some of their frequently requested records online often have no
centralized location to host them, making navigation of their websites time con-
suming and cumbersome."' The public accountability pillars of E-FOIA, there-
fore, remain weak.
The Department of Justice, which is responsible for FOIA's implementa-
tion, sought to solve some of these problems by employing a different online
tool. In March 2011, it inaugurated FOIA.gov-a web portal that compiles agen-
cies' annual FOIA reports into a customizable and searchable database. The
goals of the website are twofold. First, it displays a variety of statistics on agen-
cies' performance under FOIA."4 This endeavor follows a "naming and sham-
ing" logic, which is typical of mandatory transparency: encouraging agencies to
do well by making information about their performance accessible to all who
are interested. Second, the website pursues educational goals. It provides public
guidance on the FOIA process and helps individuals prepare their own FOIA
requests-a function that apparently aims to diminish the need for professional
intermediaries that are typically responsible for the majority of FOIA requests.
It is still too early to assess the long-term effects of FOIA.gov on FOIA im-
plementation. Time will show to what extent its "naming and shaming" mech-
anism improves agencies' responsiveness to FOIA requests, and whether the
public takes advantage of the guidance and explanations available on the web-
site. However, given the difficult history of FOIA implementation, "naming and
shaming" alone is not likely to overcome agencies' natural resistance to infor-
mation disclosure. Stronger enforcement measures and a lower threshold for
information requests are therefore required to fulfill the potential of E-FOIA
and make its transparency provisions genuinely mandatory.
3. Online Federal Spending
Online transparency policies have also been adopted as a vehicle for a more
accountable spending management. However, as with the examples of online
notice and comment and E-FOIA, efforts to disclose information on federal
spending have not necessarily led to improved public accountability. Each year
federal agencies disburse over a trillion dollars in "contracts, loans, grants, and
112. See Cohen Testimony, supra note 105, at 82 ("Most requests for correspondence
and other documents are fulfilled by printing them, redacting, then re-scanning
into unsearchable images.").
113. Id.
114. The website features charts and graphs that allow users to compare the FOIA per-
formance of different agencies, view the backlog of unanswered requests, examine
exemptions utilized by agencies, and more. See FOIA.Gov, http://www.foia.gov




other awards" to governmental and private entities."5 The spectacular amount
of federal funds funneled to private parties shapes the economy and deeply af-
fects society."' As the privatization of governmental functions has expanded in
the past decades, scholars have warned about the lack of accountability of feder-
al contractors and grantees." 7 Federal spending has therefore been perceived as
an important target for the open government movement. Pursuing the logic
that transparency promotes accountability, the assumption has been that agen-
cies would be reluctant to fund wasteful and unnecessary projects if the details
of their spending decisions are available online for all to inspect."' The next
pages discuss two online transparency policies that target federal spending and
examine their effect on the public accountability of federal government.
The E-Government Act of 2002 represents the first major attempt to infuse
transparency into federal spending by placing spending data online. It required
OMB to launch a website with relatively limited information on governmental
funds invested in research and development projects."9 Building on this frame-
work, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 20o6
(FFATA)'o took an ambitious leap forward, aiming to "increase the transpa-
rency. . . and accountability" of federal disbursements 2 ' and thus reduce waste-
ful and unnecessary spending. '2 In pursuit of this goal, the Act instructed the
OMB to create a website that provides public access to general information
about federal grants, loans, and contracts.123 The website, named USAspend-
115. Electronic Government: Implementation of the Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2006, U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 1 (2010),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dlo365.pdf [hereinafter GAO FFATA].
116. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, iu COLUM. L. REV.
154, 159-72 (2011) (discussing the distributive implications of federal spending).
117. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRA-
cy (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1304 (2003)
("[P]rivatization may enable government to avoid its traditional legal obligations,
leading to an erosion of public law norms and a systematic failure of public ac-
countability.").
118. See Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps To Increase Contractor Accountability, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 241, 241 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
119. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
120. Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. u86 (2006) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 61o (2012)).
121. GAO FFATA, supra note 115, at 1.
122. See Garrett L. Hatch, The Federal Accountability and Transparency Act: Implemen-
tation and Proposed Amendments, CON. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (2008),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL34718.pdf.
123. The following information on each award is required: the name and location of
the recipient, the amount of the award, its purpose, and any other information
specified by OMB. 31 U.S.C. § 6101.
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ing.gov, was launched in December 2007, aiming to enable civil society to "easi-
ly determine how much money was given to which organizations, and for what
purposes."'2 The website currently contains data on entities directly funded by
federal agencies, as well as subcontractors and subgrantees of federal funds reci-
pients.2 5 It allows searches by several data fields-entity, type and amount of
award, location, and the like-and shows the total amount of funds granted to
an entity in each fiscal year.2 6
The recent economic recession provided more opportunities for experi-
mentation with online spending transparency. In response to the deepening
economic crisis of 2009, the Obama Administration enacted a stimulus bill
titled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act."' The Act sought to create
jobs and offer assistance to those who were most harmed by the recession."2 Its
estimated cost was $862 billion.'2 9 This unprecedented expenditure of federal
funds was accompanied by a promise that "[a] historic level of transparency,
oversight and accountability will help guarantee taxpayer dollars are spent
wisely and Americans can see results for their investment."'30 Following the
model of USAspending.gov, the Act mandated the creation of a website where
the public can access all stimulus spending records and ensure that "the eco-
nomic recovery package is fully transparent and accountable to the American
people." 3'
Recovery.gov-launched in September 2009-indeed contains abundant
data about stimulus funds: the amount of the reported award, its general pur-
pose and precise location, the number of jobs created or retained by the award,
124. Hatch, supra note 122, at 1.
125. 31 U.S.C. § 6101. As federal funds are often allocated to large governmental recip-
ients (for example, state agencies or cities) that further disburse the funds to pri-
vate contractors, this system enables the monitoring of the flow of funds from the
federal government to the ground level.
126. Id.
127. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
128. For a general overview of the Act's provisions, see Johnson, supra note 116, at
172-79-
129. Recovery Act: Increasing the Public's Understanding of What Funds Are Being Spent
on and What Outcomes Are Expected, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 1
(2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dio58i.pdf [hereinafter GAO Recovery Act].
130. Id. atI (citing the House Appropriations Committee).
131. GAO Recovery Act, supra note 129, at 8 (quoting the Obama Administration's
pledge). Additionally, the Act establishes the Recovery Accountability and Trans-
parency Board to directly oversee the disbursement of the funds and the reporting
requirements. See The Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, RECOV-
ERY.Gov, http://www.recovery.gov/About/board/Pages/TheBoard.aspx (last vi-




and more.1' The website offers a wide variety of custom search and visualiza-
tion options, including the capacity to "track the money" to the street level and
view which organizations in a certain zip code receive federal funds and for
what purpose, compare recipients in different states, or examine agencies' and
recipients' statistics for job creation."'
Contrary to online initiatives like e-rulemaking or E-FOIA, which sought to
digitalize existing offline policies, the FFATA and the Recovery Act introduce a
new transparency mechanism that would not have been possible without the
Internet. These efforts are therefore particularly illustrative of the existing regu-
latory vision of online transparency. Indeed, public officials have applauded this
approach to online transparency, declaring that Recovery.gov will provide an
"unprecedented level of transparency into how Federal dollars are being spent
and will help drive accountability for the timely and effective spending of recov-
ery dollars."'3 4 The reality is more complex.
Both USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov have been criticized for their lack
of accuracy. The case was more severe for USAspending.gov: in March 2008, the
OMB admitted that "the data submitted for posting to [the website] in the past
has been incomplete, untimely, and inaccurate."' Two years later, in March
2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the situation
was still worrisome.' ClearSpending.com, an online tool developed by the
Sunlight Foundation, demonstrated that USAspending.gov has "over 1.2 trillion
dollars' worth of misreported spending in 2009 alone.""' And although the in-
formation on Recovery.gov was more accurate than that on USAspending.gov,
it was still imperfect.' There is no doubt that grave data inaccuracies consider-
ably impair the potential of federal spending transparency projects. However,
132. GAO Recovery Act, supra note 129, at io-ii.
133. RECOVERY.GOv, http://www.recovery.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
134. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of
Dep'ts & Agencies i (June 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/omb/assets/memoranda fy2009/mo9-21.pdf.
135. Memorandum from Robert Shea, Assoc. Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Fed.
Agencies 3 (Mar. 6, 20o8), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb
/assets/omb/memoranda/fy20o8/mo8-12.pdf.
136. See GAO FFATA, supra note 115.
137. Transparency Through Technology: Evaluating Federal Open-Government Initia-
tives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 112th Cong. 3 (20n) (statement of Ellen Miller, Co-founder and Execu-
tive Director, Sunlight Foundation), http://www.oversight.house.gov/wp-content
/uploads/2012/ol/MillerTestimony-Bio-TNT_3-n-n.pdf.
138. GAO Recovery Act, supra note 129, at 8; see Recovery Act: One Year Later, States'
and Localities' Uses of Funds and Opportunities to Strengthen Accountability, U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/dio437.pdf.
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these problems can ultimately be solved by better procedures for data collection
and validation.'39
The weaknesses of USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov are deeper than
their potential inaccuracies. A larger problem has been a lack of context for the
released data. The voluminous spending details available on the websites
represent a relatively random part of the entire federal spending chain. These
bits and pieces can hardly contribute to public accountability. In order to assess
agencies' spending decisions, one would have to know at least some of the rea-
sons that underlie their awards. What criteria guided agencies in their award
decisions? What were their funding priorities? How were the bids, if any, con-
ducted? What was the decisionmaking procedure for stimulus contracts, loans,
and awards? This information is vital for any sensible assessment of federal
spending, but none of it is publicly available.' 40 A transparency regime that
seeks to make this information available would have to require agencies to re-
lease targeted information about their decisionmaking processes and their per-
formance. Such information would contain answers to the questions of how
and why a certain decision to allocate funds was made, what were its alterna-
tives, and what are the results of this decision on the ground. 141
Furthermore, in order to determine whether an award or earmark is waste-
ful or valuable, the data available on USAspending.gov-a one-sentence de-
scription of the award coupled with the name of its recipient-cannot possibly
suffice. For instance, what should the public make out of a contract for $20 mil-
lion between the Department of Commerce and a corporation named Industri-
al Economics for "continued support for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill"?142
How could civil society meaningfully assess a contract of the Department of De-
fense with Lockheed Martin Corporation for $817 million accompanied by the
description "incremental funding"? 43 These two reports, drawn from
139. One possible strategy is to place online the spending of the Treasury Department
and compare it to the reports filed by agencies and recipients. See Achieving
Transparency and Accountability in Federal Spending: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov't, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Craig Jennings, Director
of Federal Fiscal Policy, OMB Watch), http://www.oversighthouse.gov/wp
-content/uploads/2012/ol/6-14-n jenningsTestimony.pdf.
140. See Raymond Yee, Eric C. Kensa & Erik Wilde, Improving Federal Spending Trans-
parency: Lessons Drawn from Recovery.gov, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO. REPORT 5
(2010), http://dret.net/netdret/docs/wilde-irepio-recovery-lessons.pdf (noting
that "[ilt is nearly impossible to know how actual spending patterns [on Recov-
ery.gov] mapped to Congress's wishes as expressed in the passed legislation").
141. These suggestions are discussed at more length in Section III.A supra.
142. Prime Award Spending Data, USASPENDING.Gov, http://www.usaspending.gov
(last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (search "Industrial Economics"; then sort results by
"Dollars Obligation"; then locate entry for contract signed "10-21-2010" with "Ob-
ligation Amount" of "$20,000,000").
143. Prime Award Spending Data, USASPENDING.Gov, http://www.usaspending.gov




USAspending.gov, are exemplary of its general pitfall: even if data is timely and
reliable, it does not fulfill the explanatory requirement of public accountability.
However, even if the beginning of the spending chain is obscure, transpa-
rency could be improved by providing information on the performance of fed-
eral funds recipients. But performance measurement is problematic under both
the FFATA and the Recovery Act. The websites created under these Acts contain
almost no information on the performance of federal contractors or grantees.'"
Moreover, the primary recipients of federal funds and their subcontractors or
subgrantees are the only entities obliged to file reports. In many cases, this in-
formation is not sufficient to understand how federal funds were actually spent.
A typical example would be a federal agency that allocates funds to the State of
Massachusetts for road construction. The state then allocates the funds to the
city of Boston, and Boston then signs contracts with several construction firms
that have their own subcontractors. While the state and the city are obliged to
report the receipt of federal funds, the city's contractors and subcontractors are
exempted from reporting obligations under the Recovery Act. The performance
of those who actually execute the projects therefore remains obscure.
In sum, even when the accuracy of reports on the websites is perfect, the
explanatory requirement of public accountability can be achieved only if the full
chain of federal spending becomes available and understandable. The first part
of this chain concerns how a decision to disburse funds is made, by whom, and
to what purpose. The second part is information about recipients, amounts,
and details of awards. The third part is performance data that allows assessment
of the overall effectiveness of the funded projects. As only the second part of the
chain is currently available to the public, the road to public accountability re-
mains long. Thus, as with online notice and comment and E-FOIA, while agen-
cies are obliged to release information about their spending, this mandatory
transparency regime does not considerably contribute to public accountability,
as the most relevant and important information often remains hidden from the
public eye.
Policies of mandatory online transparency have been implemented by the
federal government in three major fields: notice and comment, FOIA, and fed-
eral spending. The analysis above demonstrates that there is a single problem
plaguing each of these fields: despite their stated objectives, none offers the pub-
lic a meaningful explanation and justification of agencies' decisions and activi-
ties. The reason for this failure is not a conceptual inadequacy of mandatory
transparency as a vehicle for public accountability. On the contrary, the failure
sults by "Dollars Obligation"; then locate entry for contract signed "11-13-2008"
with "Obligation Amount" of "$817,110,000").
144. The number of "created jobs" that is reported by recovery funds recipients is im-
portant, but not sufficient as the only measure for the evaluation of the Recovery
Act. Not all funds expended on recovery projects directly create or retain jobs (in-
frastructure projects, for instance, also require payments for supplies, tools, or
equipment), and it is not clear whether jobs are the right metric for performance.
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is one of flawed design and implementation: transparency is either not suffi-
ciently mandatory or not applicable to categories of information that meaning-
fully contribute to public accountability.
Online notice and comment and online FOIA are examples of the former.
The legislation that obliges agencies to publish their dockets online took an ex-
pressly decentralized approach, thus allowing agencies to independently shape
the scope and content of their regulatory dockets. Likewise, E-FOIA does not
contain effective enforcement mechanisms. Because neither initiative imposes
sanctions on noncompliant agencies or introduces other measures to compel
them to proactively place records online, many agencies simply do not comply.
The case of federal spending transparency is a bit different. By and large,
agencies and recipients of federal funds do comply with the provisions of the
FFATA and the Recovery Act. The problem is that the Acts target information
that cannot independently enhance the public accountability of federal agen-
cies. Data on who receives federal funds and for what general purpose cannot
suffice to assess agencies' decisionmaking. What is required to evaluate agen-
cies' actions is the first part of the chain of federal spending (how spending de-
cisions are made, by whom, and following what priorities) and the last one (the
performance of federal contractors and grantees and the results they achieved).
One way or another, online transparency efforts inevitably succumb to
agencies' resistance to disclose information. Taking advantage of flawed en-
forcement and design of regulatory policies, agencies avoid unwanted disclo-
sures. The traditional barriers to the translation of transparency into public ac-
countability remain intact. The potential of the Internet to change this
distribution of power and tilt the balance in favor of meaningful transparency is
therefore unfulfilled. This conclusion does not imply that mandatory transpar-
ency is inadequate as a means to achieving public accountability. It does sug-
gest, however, that the institutional design of mandatory transparency policies
should be reformed.
B. Discretionary Transparency
While mandatory transparency reflects the traditional approach to regula-
tory transparency policies, the Internet created opportunities for new transpar-
ency policy designs. This Section examines one of those new opportunities: dis-
cretionary transparency.
A discretionary transparency policy instructs agencies to publish informa-
tion online, but leaves them the discretion to determine what exactly should be
disclosed. As with mandatory transparency policies, this policy has not resulted
in improved public accountability so far. Indeed, it comes as no surprise that, if
agencies "are given unrestrained discretion to manage information access," then
they will usually disclose "information that makes the administration look pub-
lic spirited, effective, and efficient, but withhold information to the contrary." 45
145. Samaha, supra note 4, at 919; see Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know,




The Open Government Directive (OGD), issued in December 2009, aimed
to implement the Open Government Memorandum signed by President Oba-
ma in January 2oo9.4' Adopting a presumption in favor of openness and access,
the Directive instructed agencies on how to "implement the principles of trans-
parency, participation, and collaboration"-the cornerstones of the Memoran-
dum. 47 The Directive's major policy innovation is "discretionary transparen-
cy": it instructs all federal agencies to release in an open format at least three
"high-value" raw datasets that have not been previously published and to place
them on the website Data.gov within specified deadlines.14
The amorphous term "high-value datasets" encompasses a wide variety of
information, according to agencies' discretion. '4 Although the precise meaning
of the term is not clear, it is clear that agencies are not required to expose their
agendas, priorities, or decisionmaking processes. Nonetheless, public accounta-
bility is a major goal of the Directive. In fact, one of the architects of the OGD
noted that the Directive "demonstrates the Administration's commitment to
hardwire accountability and drive[s] performance to restore the American
people's confidence in Government."' Data.gov has indeed become the flag-
ship of the Obama Administration's transparency policy.
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999, at 115, 129-36 (Matthew J. Gib-
ney ed., 2003); Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Free-
dom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2004).
146. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/ assets/memoranda_2010/mIo-o6.pdf [hereinafter Open
Government Directive].
147. Id. at 1.
148. Id. at 7.
149. "High-value" datasets are defined as "information that can be used to increase
agency accountability and responsiveness; improve public knowledge of the
agency and its operations; further the core mission of the agency; create economic
opportunity; or respond to need and demand as identified through public consul-
tation." Id. at 7-8.
150. Data-Driven Performance: Using Technology to Deliver Results: Hearing Before the
S. Budget Comm. Taskforce on Gov't Performance, 1ith Cong. 1 (2009) (statement
of Vivek Kundra, Federal Chief Information Officer, Administrator for Electronic
Government & Information Technology, Office of Management & Budget),
http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?File-id=e5f9ca20
-fo 9 d-4aft- 9325-e 37 61f6f22b. Further guidance provided to federal agencies by the
federal Chief Information Officers Council emphasized the accountability aspect
of the datasets, explaining that "agencies have been asked to post datasets on Da-
ta.gov that increase government accountability by revealing the results and cha-
racteristics of government services to citizens; the public's use of government ser-
vices; the distribution of funds from the government; and demonstrable results
from Federal programs . . . ." OFFICE OF E-Gov'T AND IT OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, FED. CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS COUNCIL, DATA.GOV CONCEPT OF OPERA-
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By October 2012, federal agencies had posted nearly 400,000 datasets on the
website, divided into three categories: raw (statistical and machine-readable)
data, geospatial data (datasets containing spatial and geographic data), and
tools that help develop applications based on the datasets. 5' The White House
seemed satisfied with the agencies' actions, granting most of them the top score
of "meets expectations" on an online "scorecard" that tracked the fulfillment of
the OGD requirements on the White House website.'" As agencies have the dis-
cretion to determine what information is placed on the website, the contents of
the datasets are telling. Not surprisingly, they have little to do with public ac-
countability.
The three leading departments in terms of dataset publication are the Cen-
sus Bureau (responsible for nearly 24o,ooo datasets), the Geological Survey (re-
sponsible for nearly 125,ooo datasets), and the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (responsible for nearly 25,000 datasets).' 3 More than
390,000 of these datasets are categorized as "geospatial data." 54 The remaining
"raw" datasets mostly contain consumer-oriented information. For instance,
datasets that White House officials labeled as "exemplary'"5 include ratings of
"child safety seats" by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, '56
datasets containing "details behind automobile safety and crash ratings" by the
Department of Transportation,' 7 and Medicare information that previously re-
quired a payment.58
TIONs DRAFT, VERSION 1.0, at 4-5 (2009), http://www.data.gov/documents
/data-govsconops-vi.o.pdf.
151. Federal Agency Participation, DATA.GOv, http://www.data.gov/metric (last visited
Nov. 23, 2012).
152. Around the Government, OPEN GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/open/around (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
153. DATA.GOV, supra note 151.
154. These datasets are arranged into several categories (for example, atmospheric and
climatic, administrative and political boundaries, inland water resources, and
transportation networks). Datasets include, for instance, the 2002 Average
Monthly Sea Surface Temperature of California and multiple Census Track Refer-
ence Maps for different U.S. counties. See DATA.Gov, http://www.data.gov
/geoportal/catalog/main/home.page (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
155. Vivek Kundra, How "Open Gov" Datasets Affect Parents and Consumers, OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/201o/o1/23/why
-open-gov-matters-you.
156. Child Seats: Ease of Use Ratings, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/Safety
/Ease-of-Use (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
157. SAFERCAR.GOV, http://www.safercar.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).




Datasets that reveal information on the decisions and performance of ad-
ministrative agencies themselves-ones that could legitimately contribute to the
public accountability of agencies-are largely absent from Data.gov.
This weak performance of Data.gov on the public accountability front can
be explained by the political context and roots of this initiative. The vision un-
derlying Data.gov and the discretionary transparency model is straightforward:
agencies should release raw data according to their discretion, and positive re-
sults will follow. Because agencies cannot know ex ante how their datasets
might be helpful to the public, they should simply publish them in a raw and
open format and wait for the public to decide how to use them and for what
purposes. The basic assumption is that private developers and programmers
will access the data and develop applications that analyze and visualize the data-
sets that interest them. As the discussion below demonstrates, this approach is
rooted in a new concept of innovative production. Such an approach, however,
is not necessarily appropriate for the political realm.
This vision of regulatory transparency derives from the principle of
"crowdsourcing"-a novel model of distributed production and problem solv-
ing. Crowdsourcing refers to a situation in which an organization distributes a
request to help with a large task across a broad online network.'1 9 There is no
limit on the number of contributors and the work is "granular"-broken into
small and discrete tasks. Participants are not primarily motivated by money and
contribute their efforts in their leisure time."'o
The crowdsourcing model was first championed as an effective strategy for
open-source peer production.'"' The basis of this theory is that "users of pro-
ducts and services. .. are increasingly able to innovate for themselves.
User-centered innovation processes offer great advantages over the manufac-
turer-centric innovation development systems that have been the mainstay of
commerce for hundreds of years.""' Empirical studies suggest that in many in-
dustries consumers are indeed the originators of the most helpful innova-
tions."' According to this theory, consumers are well positioned to innovate, as
their needs and preferences may change well before manufacturers realize it.
This innovation process has been dubbed "democratizing" because "users that
innovate can develop exactly what they want, rather than relying on manufac-
159. See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/wired
/archive/14.o6/crowdspr.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
160. See JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD Is DRIVING
THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 28-29, 62-63 (2008).
161. See id.
162. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005); see BENKLER, Supra
note 6o, at 91-132; Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of
Distributed Innovation, 2 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 97
(2007).
163. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 162; Lakhani & Panetta, supra note 162.
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turers. . . . Moreover, individual users ... can benefit from innovations devel-
oped and freely shared by others."16 4
Inspired by this revolutionary perception of economic production, the
drafters of the OGD have applied this theory to the domain of government.'
This course of action is exemplified by Tim O'Reilly, a renowned open-source
activist, who suggests treating government as a platform for innovation, or a
bazaar where "the community itself exchanges goods and services."' 66 O'Reilly
explains that as a platform provider, the goal of government is to create "core
applications that demonstrate the power of the platform and inspire outside de-
velopers to push the platform even further." 6 7 Online transparency in this con-
text has nothing to do with public accountability. Rather, it serves as a tool to
collaboratively develop socially useful applications. Indeed, following this logic,
administrative agencies developed applications that feature recalls of defective
products,'68 real-time operating status for airports,"'9 local daily air quality da-
164. vON HIPPEL, supra note 162, at i. A fascinating question in this respect is what mo-
tivates users to take part in developing and sharing innovations without being
paid. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN (2011); BENKLER,
supra note 60, at 92-99; Karim R. Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source
Software Works: "Free" User-to-User Assistance, 32 REs. POL'Y 923 (2003); Lakhani
& Panetta, supra note 162, at 103-04; Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Eco-
nomics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002); Joel West & Karim R. Lak-
hani, Getting Clear About Communities in Open Innovation, 15 INDUSTRY & INNO-
VATION 223 (20o8).
165. The first and most notable initiative of governmental crowdsourcing in the
United States was implemented in Washington, D.C in 20o8. Vivek Kundra, who
was then the Chief Technology Officer of the District, placed online 428 datasets
containing information on crime incidents and statistics, details on construction
projects, vacant properties, and more. See DATA CATALOG, http://data.octo.dc.gov
(last visited Oct. 23, 2012). His idea was to "democratize" this data: "individuals
and organizations are not only viewing our government data, but are actually im-
proving upon our work by analyzing and repurposing the information in useful
ways." Vivek Kundra, Building the Digital Public Square, APPS FOR DEMOCRACY
(Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.appsfordemocracy.org/building-the-digital-public
-square. Hence, the District of Columbia sponsored a contest, "Apps for Democ-
racy," which encouraged citizens to create and share open-source applications
that integrate and visualize governmental data for various public purposes. Id. For
an analysis of this initiative, see Shkabatur, supra note 60, at 1450-55.
166. Tim O'Reilly, Government as a Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORA-
TION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 11, 13 (Daniel Lathrop &
Laurel Ruma eds., 2010). The bazaar metaphor is borrowed from Eric Raymond's
influential manifesto on open-source programming. ERIC RAYMOND, THE CA-
THEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN AccI-
DENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (2001).
167. O'Reilly, supra note 166, at 36.
168. RECALLS.Gov, http://www.recalls.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).




ta, 7 o weekly reports on fatalities and catastrophes from OSHA, 7 ' and more."
In line with the open-source production philosophy, Data.gov offers a platform
for experimentation and innovation, while agencies lead by example, develop-
ing applications with useful consumer information and encouraging private de-
velopers to join in and create their own applications and mash-ups.'73
Although agencies chose to release mostly consumer-oriented information
on Data.gov, this does not mean that governmental crowdsourcing cannot suc-
ceed as a vehicle to increase public accountability. If agencies had been man-
dated to release datasets with information on their decisionmaking processes
and performance, the concept of crowdsourcing could have been more impact-
ful. However, as in the e-rulemaking initiative, a notable feature of the OGD is
its decentralized approach. Instead of dictating standards of disclosure, it in-
structs agencies to develop their own "open government plan[s]," letting them
decide what types of datasets would be released and what other steps would be
taken to "improve transparency and integrate public participation and collabo-
ration" into the agencies' activities.'7 4 Moreover, the OGD does not place any
sanctions on agencies that fail to fulfill the Directive's requirements. Not surpri-
singly, this institutional design hardly persuades agencies to publish intrusive
information about their own activities or decisions. Hence, while the decentra-
lized approach can be beneficial in allowing agencies to tailor online transpa-
rency policies to their unique structure and capacity, its implementation in this
case is problematic due to the broad discretion it grants.
A different accountability obstacle is the OGD's policy to release raw data-
sets rather than contextualized information. In line with O'Reilly's metaphor of
"government as a platform," the OGD sought to prevent agencies from present-
170. AIR Now, http://www.airnow.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
171. Weekly Reports of Fatalities, Catastrophes, and Other Events, OCCUPATIONAL SAFE-
TY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/dep/fatcat/dep-fatcat.html (last vi-
sited Oct. 23, 2012).
172. Open Government Highlights, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov
open/highlights (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
173. A "mash-up" means a "creative combination or mixing of content from different
sources." Mash-up Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.reference.
com/browse/mash+up?s=t (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). While the OGD did not
provide agencies with incentives to release sensitive information, it did pay atten-
tion to incentives given to the public to tinker with the data, offering contests and
prizes. See Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Exec.
Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda-2olo/mlo-in.pdf.
174. Open Government Directive, supra note 146; see Data-Driven Performance: Using
Technology To Deliver Results: Hearing Before the S. Budget Comm. Taskforce on
Gov't Performance, ith Cong. (2009) (statement of Aneesh Chopra, Chief Tech-
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ing regulatory information in a certain light or within a specific context, and
instead aimed to convey it to the public in its "naked" form-that is, in raw da-
tasets.'75 This policy stems from the desire to achieve neutrality, but neutrality is
hardly possible if agencies are allowed to decide what raw data they release.
A second, related problem is distributive in nature. While a major goal of
the open government enterprise is to make governmental information easily ac-
cessible to the general public, Data.gov does not necessarily lower the access
threshold. Professional intermediaries have to develop mash-ups and applica-
tions in order to bridge the raw datasets and the interested public. Data.gov
therefore generates a bias of access-or a "data divide"-in favor of established
organizations and individuals with programming skills.176 In some cases, these
organizations and individuals will strive to unveil information that sheds light
on agencies' activities and contributes to public accountability. It is, however,
risky to base a transparency policy on the probability that these organizations
and individuals will timely intervene to make raw datasets accessible to the gen-
eral public.
The White House emphasized that Data.gov will "increase agency accoun-
tability. . . and change the default setting of Washington to be open, transpar-
ent and participatory."'"7 But a closer look reveals that the enthusiasm about
"government as a platform" has little to do with improved public accountability
of administrative agencies. Discretionary transparency as a vehicle for public
accountability therefore seems misplaced. In the end, discretionary transparen-
cy has failed to overcome the traditional challenges of regulatory openness.
Since agencies are the ones who shape their disclosure policies in the first place,
no measures are taken against agencies' tendency to avoid unwanted disclo-
sures. Moreover, barriers of access to information become higher as informa-
tion is released in the form of raw datasets that only professional intermediaries
can decipher.
175. Karim R. Lakhani, Robert D. Austin & Yumi Yi, Data.gov 7 (2010),
http://www.data.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/hbs-datagov-case-study.pdf
(Harvard Business School Case Study).
176. See Michael B. Gurstein, Open Data: Empowering the Empowered or Effective Data
Use for Everyone, FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin
/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index/php/fmarticle/view/3316/2764 (discussing various issues
related to the data divide).
177. Kundra, supra note 155; see also Data.gov Concept of Operations, OFFICE OF
E-Gov'T & IT & OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET 4 (2009),
http://www.data.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/data-gov-conopsv.o.pdf
(explaining that Data.gov aims at "[ilncreasing the ability of the public to discov-
er, understand, and use the stores of government data to increase government ac-





An agency's transparency policy is not determined exclusively by decisions
as to what information should be available in the public domain. Transparency
policies are also shaped by the agency's reaction to leaks of classified or other-
wise restricted information. I call this regime involuntary transparency.
Whistleblowers-the primary source of involuntary transparency-can be
an important driver of public accountability, functioning as an external and in-
dependent check on agencies' behavior. As the recent Wikileaks controversy
demonstrates, the Internet now plays an unprecedented role in fostering such
involuntary disclosures and in lighting up the dark corners of regulatory deci-
sionmaking." While mechanisms of involuntary transparency should be used
with caution and without obstructing administrative decisionmaking, their po-
tential to reveal abuses and malfunctions should not be underestimated. None-
theless, in practice, federal whistleblowers are hardly praised.
The treatment of governmental whistleblowers and Wikileaks is telling in
this respect. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama expressed avid support
for whistleblowers. In his campaign's "Ethics Agenda," he referred to "govern-
ment employee[s] committed to public integrity and willing to speak out" as
being one of "the best source[s] of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in
government."' 9 He promised to strengthen whistleblower laws to protect feder-
al employees who expose administrative wrongs and ensure that whistleblowers'
claims are expeditiously reviewed by the authorities.' These promises, how-
ever, have not been realized. While the Obama Administration initiated an am-
bitious effort to declassify governmental records,'' the Administration's treat-
ment of whistleblowers has been far less favorable.
The most dramatic example of this tendency has been the Obama Adminis-
tration's "unprecedented crackdown on leaks.""' Unauthorized disclosures of
information to the media have thus far triggered criminal charges under the Es-
pionage Act of 1917 in five cases during the Obama Administration, compared
178. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the
Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011).
179. The Obama-Biden Plan, CHANGE.Gov, http://www.change.gov/agenda/ethics
agenda (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
180. Id.
181. See Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information: Memoran-
dum from the President to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
26,277 (June 1, 2009). The memorandum requires establishing a National Declas-
sification Center in order "to perform collaborative declassification review," de-
velop "[e]ffective measures to address the problem of over classification," and "fa-
cilitate greater sharing of classified information among appropriate parties." Id.
182. Scott Shane, U.S. Pressing Its Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2oni/o6/18/us/politics/181eak.html; see also Jane Mayer,
The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46.
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with only three cases "under all previous Administrations combined."'8 3 Notor-
ious for its vagueness, breadth, and confusing language,'8 1 the Act remains on
the books but had scarcely been used by previous administrations. The exces-
sive reliance on the Espionage Act in order to prosecute federal whistleblowers
is alarming.'8 5 According to its plain language, the Act can apply "to a media
entity or reporter who obtains, retains, or publishes national defense informa-
tion, thus threatening to impose criminal sanctions on news organizations.
As the Act was developed during "one of the most fiercely repressive periods in
American history,""' its renaissance in recent years has been dubbed "a re-
markable exercise in historical amnesia. ""
The Espionage Act is the harshest measure taken against whistleblowers,
but it is by no means the only one. The Obama Administration's crackdown on
leaks has also defined the President's legislative strategy on two recent propos-
als. The first of these was the Free Flow of Information Act,'"' which sought to
protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources by imposing on the executive
the burden to prove that their disclosure was necessary to prevent significant
harm to national security.'9 o Although then-Senator Obama was one of the
sponsors of the bill in 2007, President Obama later "objected to the scope of the
privilege envisioned by the bill" and requested an amendment to "require
judges to defer to executive branch judgments."'91 The Whistleblower Protec-
183. Shane, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publi-
cation of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 264 (2oo8) (noting that "[t]he potential breadth and
scope of the various provisions of the current Espionage Act are staggering").
185. For a review of measures other than the Espionage Act that can be taken against
whistleblowers, see Papandrea, supra note 184, at 245-48.
186. Id. at 264. Section 793 of the Act prohibits individuals from gathering, transmit-
ting, or receiving defense information with the intent or reason to believe it will
be used against the United States or to the benefit of a foreign nation. 18 U.S.C. §
793 (2ooo). Individuals who possess defense information--either lawfully or
not-and have reason to believe that it can be used to harm national security are
prohibited from disclosing this information to persons who are not authorized to
possess it. Id. § 793(e).
187. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SE-
DITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 153 (2004).
188. Id. at 337.
189. S. 2035, noth Cong. (2007), http://www.govtrack.us /congress/bls/11o/s2035.
190. Id. § 5. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 81, 100 (2012) (explaining context of statute).




tion Enhancement Act'92 presents a similar example. This legislation, which en-
joyed broad bipartisan support, aimed to protect several categories of federal
employees who report information of public concern to Congress or the media.
But because the Obama Administration "has not taken any significant steps to-
ward strengthening whistleblower protections," the "bill still languishes in
committee." 9
President Obama's antiwhistleblowing record is puzzling given his cam-
paign promises and his general transparency pedigree. One possible explanation
might be what Geoffrey Stone calls the "trust us" approach, where "[t]hose in
power are always certain that they themselves will act reasonably . . . [and]
therefore resist limitations on their own discretion." 9 4 This reasoning is cer-
tainly plausible, but there might be more to the story. In fact, the current presi-
dential administration has been the first to confront the transformative effects
of technology on governmental whistleblowing: the Internet has made it easier
than ever to leak massive amounts of information, but harder than ever to ex-
pose whistleblowers.
Wikileaks is the most famous example of this new reality. Wikileaks defines
itself as "a not-for-profit media organization" dedicated to "bring[ing] impor-
tant news and information to the public."'95 The organization owes much of its
success to the efficacy of its technological strategy-it offers a secure and
anonymous channel for individuals around the world to leak information "of
ethical, political and historical significance."'9' Because the identity of Wiki-
leaks's sources is kept hidden, the website promises to provide "a universal way
for the revealing of suppressed and censored injustices. "1 9 7
After information is anonymously leaked to Wikileaks, there are two stra-
tegic venues for its release. From 20o6 to 2010, Wikileaks published the infor-
mation on its own website and invited the general public to inspect and analyze
it. Using this strategy, Wikileaks brought to light information on extrajudicial
killings in Kenya, evidence of an assassination plot in Somalia, a membership
list of the far right British National Party, and other documents pertaining to
the public and private sectors.' 9 After 2010, Wikileaks began to coordinate with
major mainstream news organizations such as The Guardian, The New York
Times, Der Spiegel, and Le Monde. In particular, Wikileaks partnered with these
192. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, S. 372, m1th Cong. (2010),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-ls372es/pdf/BILLS-llns372es.pdf; H.R.
1507, inth Cong. (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-inihrl507ih/pdf
/BILLS-ulhr1507ih.pdf.
193. Stone, supra note 190, at 99.




198. Benkler, supra note 178, at 315-17.
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organizations to release its most controversial troves: a cache of 77,000 Afghan
war logs,'" 400,000 field reports from the Iraq war,2 0 0 and highlights from
250,ooo American embassy cables.20 '
This last set of disclosures sent the American executive branch into turmoil.
After losing control of classified information, it launched a "multi-system at-
tack"2 o2 against the organization. This attack included efforts to link Wikileaks
to the war on terror,2 03 misrepresenting Wikileaks's activities, 2 0 4 initiating legal
investigations, threatening to charge its founder under the Espionage Act,2 03
and pressing private service providers such as Amazon and PayPal to cease
working with the organization.206
Wikileaks and other groups that follow in its footsteps signify the beginning
of a new era of governmental whistleblowing. 20 7 Anonymous, the online net-
work of hackers, represents another prime example of this phenomenon.20s As
technology has made leaks easier and made identifying the actual whistleblower
harder, the Obama Administration has attempted to strengthen deterrence.
Given the existing legal framework, legal sanctions must target the whistleblow-
er; once information is leaked, "[t]he government has little authority to stop the
press from publishing whatever it can find out."20 9 While the First Amendment
does not grant substantial protection to whistleblowers, it does protect "those
who receive that information and then broadcast it." 210 The Obama Adminis-
tration's war against leaks can therefore be understood as a response to the new
whistleblowing reality created by the Internet.
199. Id. at 324.
200. Id. at 325.
201. Id. at 327-30.
202. Id. at 330.
203. Id. at 331-33.
204. Id. at 333-36.
205. Id. at 337-38.
206. Id. at 339-42.
207. Id. at 376-79, 393-96.
208. Anonymous launches coordinated Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
against firms, organizations, and governmental entities as an act of protest. For a
comprehensive discussion of Anonymous, see Yochai Benkler, Hacks of Valor,
FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137382/Yochai
-benkler/hacks-of-valor.
209. Pozen, supra note 51, at 283; see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001); Smith
v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); see Benkler, supra note 178, at 351-65;
Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1034-35; Stone, supra note 190, at 91-95.




This hostility towards whistleblowers is worrisome. Leaks can play an im-
portant role in agencies' public accountability. Agencies, fearful that informa-
tion might leak, might be less likely to engage in dubious activities. Relaxing
whistleblower protections might therefore obstruct this valuable accountability
mechanism.
D. Transparency Without Accountability
The previous Sections surveyed the three major regimes of online transpar-
ency. These regimes are typically considered effective vehicles for public ac-
countability and are enthusiastically commended by many advocates of open
government. Criticism of these policies usually focuses on technical problems,
such as data quality and reporting accuracy. Although these concerns are legi-
timate, this Article addresses a different and deeper problem: namely, that while
the existing design of online policies may lead to more transparency, it does not
(and cannot) lead to better public accountability.
Regulatory transparency is supposed to compel agencies to publicly explain
and justify their activities. However, in practice, explanations and justifications
are largely absent. The age of the Internet has not changed agencies' ability to
escape public scrutiny by carefully avoiding unwanted online disclosures.
The disconnect between transparency and accountability stems from two
structural flaws of current online transparency policies: (1) the fact that agencies
are allowed to retain control over regulatory information, and (2) the high thre-
shold of access to online information.
First, agencies have large discretion to determine the scope of their infor-
mation disclosures. Because the current architecture of online transparency pol-
icies is highly decentralized, it allows agencies to design and implement their
own transparency schemes, determining their depth and breadth. Given this
discretion, agencies naturally refrain from disclosing potentially sensitive or
embarrassing information about their own activities. Instead, they release gen-
eral information about the regulated field or generalized data that covers regu-
lated entities.
This tendency is particularly evident within the discretionary transparency
model. Here, agencies are obligated to disclose information, but are given only
vague guidance about what information should be disclosed. Thus, agencies
provide the public with a wide array of data that might be helpful for a variety
of purposes, but generally has nothing to do with public accountability. Manda-
tory transparency policies are no different in this respect. Some of these policies
are lax, permitting agencies to comply only partially or not at all (as in the case
of E-FOIA). Other policies are overly decentralized, allowing agencies a rela-
tively wide range of discretion to determine the types of information they pub-
lish online (as in the case of online notice and comment). Yet other policies
simply target the wrong categories of information. Though they may achieve
accurate reporting, these policies frequently fail to reveal information that
would be necessary to assess agencies' decisions (as in the case of federal spend-
ing transparency). Bureaucratic reactions to instances of involuntary transpar-
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ency follow a similar logic. Afraid of losing control over information, the execu-
tive branch has introduced harsh sanctions against whistleblowers, who
represent a direct threat to agencies' monopoly over information. While these
policies address a variety of regulatory matters, their common denominator is
that they enable agencies to retain control over information and to refrain from
unwanted disclosures.
As a result, the supply of the data published on governmental websites does
not necessarily meet public demand. It is not clear who is served by the volu-
minous information available on agencies' websites, let alone how this informa-
tion can improve public accountability. This problem is again most prevalent in
the context of discretionary transparency. Agencies are not required to justify
why they release certain datasets and not others. Nor are they required to ex-
plain to what extent their disclosure decisions satisfy actual public demands for
information. This leads agencies to engage in costly releases of datasets in an at-
tempt to follow the prescriptions of the OGD, without providing any indication
as to whether and how this information is useful and to whom. Mandatory
transparency suffers from similar flaws. As agencies develop their own e-
rulemaking schemes, their decision as to the precise contents of their dockets
does not necessarily reflect public needs. The FOIA memorandum did attempt
to match public demands for information, requiring agencies to publish on
their websites frequently requested records. However, this requirement was not
accompanied by sanctions, and agencies largely ignored it.2"' Lastly, agencies'
resistance to match information supply with demand is exacerbated in cases of
involuntary transparency. The "crackdown on leaks" by the Obama Adminis-
tration attempts to skew the balance between what civil society seeks to reveal
and what the government is willing to disclose in its own favor.
The second structural flaw of the current online transparency policies is li-
mited access to regulatory information-a challenge that also plagued
pre-Internet transparency policies. The premise of projects such as Data.gov,
USAspending.gov, and Recovery.gov is that nongovernmental intermediaries
can step in and translate the raw data for the general public. The ideal watchdog
might be OMB Watch, Pro Publica, the Sunlight Foundation, or some other
nonprofit organization with the public's interest at heart. The declared mission
of these organizations is to provide investigative research and technological
tools that expose and explain agencies' activities to the public. By employing
specialists who can extract relevant information from datasets available on go-
vernmental websites and publish it in a contextualized, explanatory, and access-
ible manner, these organizations may make meaningful contributions to the
fight for agency accountability.
The problem is that only a handful of public interest organizations can af-
ford to render this type of help. In regulatory fields where such intermediaries
are absent or less organized, public accountability will remain elusive. Hence,
while the Internet lowers the cost of access to information, the form of the re-
leased information is problematic. Raw datasets inhibit the ability of a broad




array of individuals and civil society groups to effectively access and understand
the released information. The current reliance on raw datasets that require pro-
fessional processing and programming skills should therefore be reconsidered.
In sum, the current architecture of online transparency policies has not
managed to avoid the two traditional pitfalls of transparency policies-barriers
to information access and agencies' resistance to exposure. Despite high hopes
that the Internet would transform regulatory transparency and strengthen
agencies' accountability to the general public, the introduction of the Internet
seems to have had only marginal effects. While the quantity of available regula-
tory information has exponentially increased, it has not translated into quality.
A major reason for this failure is a flawed design of online transparency policies.
As discussed above, these policies allow agencies to retain control over regulato-
ry information, letting them decide what information will be released to the
public, when, and in what form. Lacking agencies' explanations and justifica-
tions for their priorities, decisionmaking processes, and performance, online
transparency cannot (and does not) improve public accountability. In hopes of
achieving true accountability, the next Part of this Article discusses how this
regulatory reality can be reformed.
III. ALTERNATIVE ONLINE ARCHITECTURES: TRANSPARENCY WITH ACCOUNTA-
BILITY
The core idea of the existing enterprise of online transparency is appealing
in its simplicity: instruct agencies to place as much regulatory data as possible
online and public accountability will improve. In a sense, the Internet is envi-
sioned as an independent agent of change, embraced by agencies that strive to
make their operations more transparent and accessible to the public.
The previous Parts demonstrated that, in reality, this vision has not been
realized. Agencies do not easily accommodate transparency requirements. They
do not strive to take advantage of the Internet to make regulatory information
broadly accessible. Even if required to disclose information, agencies release da-
ta that may not independently improve public accountability. The role of the
Internet in regulatory transparency policies should be understood as part of this
context. In some cases, the networked capacity of the Internet is sufficiently
powerful to generate new and relatively independent political structures."' But
the case of administrative agencies is different. Because agency resistance hind-
ers the potential of the Internet to promote public accountability, the institu-
tional design of online transparency policies should be more nuanced.
First, the content of online transparency policies-and not only the rhetor-
ic that accompanies their implementation-should focus on agency accounta-
212. A prominent example of such an independent structure is Wikipedia. See JOSEPH
MICHAEL REAGLE JR., GOOD FAITH COLLABORATION: THE CULTURE OF WIKIPE-
DIA (2010).
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bility to the public. Rather than letting agencies disclose whatever data they
choose, online transparency policies should require agencies to explain and jus-
tify their decisions. Further, regulatory information should be released in a
form that allows multiple stakeholders-and not only the most professional
public interest groups-to share, process, and publicize information that is per-
tinent to agencies' public accountability. Lastly, robust enforcement measures
should be introduced to ensure that agencies follow their transparency obliga-
tions.
Second, more attention should be paid to the ways in which the Internet
can help civil society groups to hold agencies accountable. The use of the Inter-
net should be closely tied to the mechanisms civil society now uses to hold
agencies accountable: litigation and public advocacy. The former triggers judi-
cial oversight of administrative agencies; the latter relies on a broad array of le-
gal, political, and social mechanisms that may eventually shift agencies' behav-
ior. The Internet should be used to strengthen the ability of civil society to
access and effectively utilize these mechanisms.
A. The Scope and Form ofRegulatory Transparency
A major pitfall of the current transparency architecture is that it largely al-
lows agencies to decide what types of information should be placed in the pub-
lic domain. A more nuanced design of online transparency policies can help
solve this problem. This Part discusses three core components of this alternative
institutional design: the scope of transparency policies, their intended audience,
and improved enforcement measures.
i. Process and Performance Transparency
The APA requires federal agencies to publish in the Federal Register descrip-
tions of their structure and organization, statements of general policy, rules of
procedure, and substantive rules of general applicability, along with amend-
ments, interpretations, and guidance documents."' Adjudicatory opinions, or-
ders, statements of policy, and interpretations not published in the Register still
have to be made "available for public inspection and copying." 14 Agencies are
obliged to release their proposed rules for public comments as part of the
rulemaking process and to publish their final rules following the notice and
comment procedure. 1 ' This voluminous amount of information, however,
does not necessarily explain an agency's decision or allow the public to assess
the soundness of the agency's reasoning.
This Section argues that the current focus of transparency policies should
be altered. Since explanation and justification of agencies' activities are at the
213. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012).
214. Id. § 552(a)(2).




core of public accountability, online transparency policies should compel agen-
cies to release information on process and performance online. The next pages
elaborate on these proposed principles, making the case for process and per-
formance transparency as the hallmarks of an improved online transparency
regime.
First, process transparency can considerably contribute to the public ac-
countability of agencies. The existing policies of regulatory transparency focus
mainly on the transparency of agencies' decisions, often leaving the input into
those decisions hidden behind closed doors. A requirement of "process trans-
parency," which targets the inputs flowing into regulatory decisionmaking,
would be more effective. Shedding light on the regulatory process is necessary
for several reasons. First, even if the resulting decision is socially optimal and
desirable, "it may still be important in a democracy to understand whether it is
the result of particular interest group pressure"2"6 and what other regulatory al-
ternatives are available. Second, process transparency may improve the quality
of decisionmaking; indeed, "[t]he need to articulate public-regarding rationales
requires participants to move away from positions too obviously tailored to
their self-interest ....
These goals are, however, not easy to implement. FOIA explicitly exempts
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" from disclosure,'18 thus
entitling agencies to withhold internal deliberative and predecisional docu-
ments.2 '9 The exemption reflects the common law "deliberative process privi-
lege," which aims to protect and facilitate genuine internal deliberations and
prevent premature (and potentially confusing) publications of proposed poli-
cies. 2 2 0 There is no doubt that "frank discussion of legal and policy matters is
216. VERMEULE, supra note ii, at 187.
217. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,
5o DUKE L.J. 1277, 1291 (2001); see also Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution
Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, i (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (noting that
"the effect of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the language of
reason and to replace impartial motives by passionate ones"); Staszewski, supra
note 5, at 1279-84 (discussing the value of reason-giving by public officials).
218. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
219. The exemption protects "decision making processes of government agencies and
focus[es] on documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deli-
berations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and poli-
cies are formulated." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted); see also Dowdle, supra note 3, at 8
(discussing the wide application of this exemption).
220. See, e.g., 421 U.S. 132, 149-50; Casad v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 301
F.3d 1247, 1251 (ioth Cir. 2002) (noting that "officials will not communicate can-
didly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front
page news" (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Mapother v. Dep't of Jus-
tice, 3 F-3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 237
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal To Fortify
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essential to the decisionmaking process of a governmental agency."2 2 ' The sug-
gested process transparency does not, however, conflict with the FOIA exemp-
tion.
The gist of the proposed process transparency mechanism is an ex post rea-
soning of how a decision has been made, providing meaningful information on
the regulatory process but leaving ample room for internal consultations. Such
an explanation need not include the minutes and precise details of each meeting
and conversation held by agency officials. The failure of "sunshine acts," which
oblige agencies to open their meetings to the public, demonstrates that such re-
quirements often undermine the objectives of process transparency. Public offi-
cials respond to such acts not by disclosing information, but rather by adopting
alternative methods of confidential communication.2 Ex post reasoning, on
the other hand, would require public officials to explain the values and priori-
ties that underlie their decisions. A watered-down version of this practice exists
in the context of notice and comment, as agencies are mandated to explain the
basis of their final rules and respond to public comments. However, the quality
of the information provided as part of notice and comment varies from one
regulation to another. 3 The real purpose of process transparency is to substan-
tiate and improve the modest reasoning requirement under the traditional no-
tice and comment procedure, while extending its logic to other regulatory
spheres such as federal spending.
Given agencies' reluctance to reveal substantive information on their deci-
sionmaking processes, the required ex post reasoning can be based on uniform
and standardized templates, requesting agencies' answers to specific queries.
For instance, agencies could be asked to publicly explain the most problematic
parts of their decision and the major difficulties associated with its implementa-
tion, the regulatory priorities that led them to the decision, the regulatory alter-
natives that were considered but left behind, and the advantages of their deci-
sion over alternatives. Rather than requiring agencies to release unstructured
regulatory data and thus generate massive overflows of (often meaningless) in-
formation, an ex post facto response to such standardized questions could
strengthen the ability to assess administrative decisions in a vast array of regula-
the Deliberative Process Privilege 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769 (2005); Russell L. Weaver
& James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REV. 279 (1989).
221. United States v. Farley, n F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Sears, 421 U.S. at
151 (explaining that "the ultimate purpose of this long-recognized privilege is to
prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions").
222. For an analysis of the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act of 1972, see Croley & Funk, supra note 38; and Funk, su-
pra note 18, at 183-91; -
223. See Cudlar, supra note 34; Mendelson, supra note 33, at 1346 ("[Algency officials
appear to be discounting... value-laden comments, even when they are numer-
ous."); see also discussion accompanying supra notes 33-34 (discussing the prob-




tory domains. If enforced and implemented properly, it could considerably
enrich the public sphere and fuel better informed public deliberations over reg-
ulatory choices and priorities.
In the context of federal spending, for example, such a requirement would
capture the context of major federal grants (and not only their technical de-
tails).2 2 4 What were the priorities that led the agency to invest federal funding in
a specific project? Why was one contractor chosen over other contenders? What
difficulties does the agency foresee in the implementation of this decision? Who
are the most important stakeholders and how are they affected by the decision?
Given the widespread concern about the lack of accountability of privatization
processes, these questions are more pertinent than the specific details of the
monetary award that are currently disclosed by agencies.
As agencies resist disclosure obligations, process transparency is likely to
encounter implementation difficulties. Agencies may argue, for example, that
such a transparency obligation is overly costly and a hindrance to effective regu-
lation. This objection is only partially valid. First, a substantial part of the re-
quired information is already produced by agencies as part of their reporting
obligations to congressional and presidential oversight bodies.2 5 Responding to
process-oriented questions on the basis of these reports and revealing some of
them should not be overly burdensome. Second, federal funds are already allo-
cated to support the existing, problematic transparency policies. Funneling
these funds into more productive channels can be more beneficial than sustain-
ing policies of doubtful value.
Another objection is that process transparency would jeopardize trade se-
crets and other sensitive information held by industry and business interests.
Indeed, transparency policies should take these concerns into account and pro-
vide private parties the necessary safeguards. However, the balance between
transparency and business interests should be tilted toward the former. For in-
stance, one option would be to create a default of transparency and "impose ri-
gorous substantiation requirements on companies claiming that information
submitted to the government is confidential."22 6 Another option would be to
mandate agencies' response to process-oriented questions and, if necessary, re-
quest their inspectors general or an independent oversight commission to cen-
sor specific sensitive details.2 2 7
Lastly, agencies may avert the reasoning requirement of process transpar-
ency by only formally complying with it-responding to the template questions
224. As the implementation of the reasoning requirement may require an expenditure
of administrative resources, it can be limited to larger grants (for example, over
$20,000), while smaller grants could be exempted.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 293-294 for a discussion of agencies' reporting
obligations to Congress and the President.
226. Vladeck, supra note 40, at 1832.
227. For a discussion of the role of federal inspectors general and an oversight commis-
sion, see infra Part IV.A.3(a).
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without revealing substantive information, or constructing an overly rosy
narrative of their activities. These behaviors do not necessarily undermine the
advantages of process transparency. As discussed below,"' improved enforce-
ment measures can help mitigate these effects. As the existing transparency pol-
icies are not effectively enforced, noncompliance or selective compliance is
common. The introduction of more robust enforcement mechanisms could
make attempts to avert the reasoning requirement more costly and impel agen-
cies to reveal better information.
Improved enforcement would not, however, completely solve the distorted
narrative concern. Once public officials release contextualized information on
their decisionmaking processes, they can frame this information in their own
terms, presenting self-assuring evidence and imposing their own vision of the
process. However, despite these possible biases, such framing capacity is not
necessarily a problem. First, effective enforcement should prevent overly biased
explanations. Further, a questionable narrative may actually expose the agency
to criticism and allow civil society "to contest both what public officials have
said and what they have done."" 9 An official ex-post narrative (even if faulty
and self-assuring) may provide the grounds for fertile public debate and criti-
cism.2"o
Process transparency, which lays out considerations that led the agency to
make a regulatory decision, is only one part of an effective transparency regime.
It should be complemented by a second policy mechanism: "performance
transparency."
In order to assess the decisions taken by federal agencies, it is important to
understand the extent of their implementation and the degree of their success.
Knowing how much money an agency disburses in order to rebuild New Or-
leans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is important but not sufficient.
What is more informative for public accountability purposes-but also more
difficult to capture-is how these funds were distributed and to what extent
they improved the social and economic conditions in New Orleans. This infor-
mation should be disclosed to the public as part of a performance-transparency
policy. Such policy should rely on uniform indicators, developed and measured
by independent bodies and open for public scrutiny.
Measuring performance is, of course, a highly complex task. Nonetheless,
much of this information already exists but is largely unavailable to the public.
The performance of federal agencies is routinely scrutinized by the presidential
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), professionally staffed congressional
228. See infra Part IV.A.3.
229. Staszewski, supra note 5, at 1289.
23o. See id. ("[TInsincerity does not eliminate our ability to evaluate the merits of
[public officials' and citizens'] choices or the explanations that they have provided





committees, and the GAO."' The Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) of 1993 requires agencies to submit to Congress and the OMB strategic
plans with their goals and objectives for a period of not less than five years.2 32
Detailed "performance plans" supplement these documents and explain how
agencies intend to evaluate their proposed programs.2 33 As part of the annual
"program performance reports," agencies compare their original objectives to
the actual performance of the programs and, if necessary, explain discrepan-
cies.13 4 As the GPRA instructs agencies to measure their own performance, it is
hardly a model for effective performance transparency. 3 However, the Act
demonstrates that the administrative state is regularly engaged in performance
assessment.
The goal of performance transparency is to improve the quality of this in-
formation and make it accessible to civil society. Congressional reports and tes-
timonies on agencies' performance are largely available online, but they are not
easily accessible, searchable, or comparable. A meaningful transparency policy
requires that agencies find a way to make this information readily searchable.
Reports filed under the GPRA are problematic in this respect since they are cur-
rently unavailable to the public. The new Government Performance and Results
Modernization Act of 20103 instructs agencies to place performance-related
data on a designated website by October 2012. 237 The website, Performance.gov,
was launched in late August 2011. It already contains information on agencies'
performance in a variety of fields, such as acquisitions, financial management,
human resources, technology, sustainability, and more.31 It is still early to as-
sess the effectiveness of the Act and the website, but they represent a step in the
right direction. While the precise form of performance measurement is outside
the scope of this Article, this task should lie at the core of regulatory transpar-
ency policies.
231. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 61, 140
(2006).
232. 5 U.S.C. § 306 (2012).
233. 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012).
234. Id. § 1116.
235. The Act allows agencies "to protect themselves by devising euphemistic perfor-
mance goals in order to ensure that they can 'pass' their own grading criteria."
Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Me-
trics, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2008). For an alternative system of agencies' per-
formance measurement based on "positive metrics," see id. at 1769-84.
236. H.R. 2142, 1ith Cong. (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-lhr2l42enr
/pdf/BILLS-inhr2142enr.pdf.
237. The Act also requires each agency to appoint a senior executive as the agency
"Performance Improvement Officer" and establishes a "Performance Improve-
ment Council" that would oversee the implementation of the Act. Id.
238. Id. § 9.
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In order to ilustrate the practical implementation of the two transparency
principles outlined above, consider two examples: railway construction and oil
spill prevention. On September 27, 2011, the Department of Transportation an-
nounced a grant of $48 million to the states of North Carolina and Virginia "to
develop high-speed rail between Raleigh, North Carolina, and Washington,
DC."2 '9 Under the existing transparency framework, a report would appear on
Recovery.gov indicating the amount of funds granted to each state and the
money paid to immediate subcontractors. But there would not be any informa-
tion on the reasons and priorities that led the DOT to disburse federal funds to
this specific project, nor any information on other projects that competed to
receive these funds. Moreover, civil society would not have information on the
performance of these contracts; as has been noted, disclosure requirements un-
der the Recovery Act only cover subgrantees (cities, in our example) and do not
proceed further down the line. A transparency policy that aims to strengthen
agencies' public accountability would target these missing pieces of informa-
tion. Such a policy would offer an explanation of why this specific railway was
chosen, who chose it, and what alternative spending options were rejected. The
performance report on the construction of the railway would then be made
public, so that interested parties could critique the agency's decision.
A second example is the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure
(SPCC) rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).24o
The rule establishes procedures and methods to deal with discharges of oil and
hazardous substances from onshore and offshore facilities. It imposes on oil-
producing facilities a variety of obligations and it requires them to compile in-
dividual SPCC plans under strict deadlines.2 41 Since the rule and its amend-
ments underwent the notice and comment procedure, its basic rationale was
explained to the public. However, the "process transparency" system suggested
above would provide a valuable supplement to this information. Such transpa-
rency would shed light on the difficulties associated with the implementation of
the rule, its effects, and the regulatory alternatives that were considered but ul-
timately left behind. Further, as part of the performance transparency require-
ment, the EPA would have to release information on industry performance and
239. U.S. Department of Transportation Award N.C. and Va. $48 Million to Develop
High-Speed Rail Between Raleigh, NC and Washington, DC, RECOVERY.GOv (Sept.
27, 2on), http://www.recovery.gov/News/press/Pages/2ono927_DOTHighSpeed
RailNCarolinaVirginia.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
240. 40 C.F.R. pt. 112 (2012); see also Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure
(SPCC) Rule, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov
/emergencies/content/spcc/index.htm (providing full information on updates and
amendments to the rule).
241. For an overview of the rule, see Bill Jeffery, Oops!-Accidents Happen: Oil Pollu-




assessments of its own effectiveness in the context of oil spill prevention, prepa-
redness, and response.242
The next subsections discuss who the audience of these policies should be
and how effective enforcement of these policies can be ensured.
2. Expanding the Audience of Online Transparency
Existing online transparency initiatives are largely oriented toward estab-
lished interest groups (for example, online notice and comment and federal
spending) and sophisticated programmers (for example, Data.gov). The online
presentation of information-as raw datasets or technical federal award en-
tries-hardly permits nonorganized individuals to use the information to
monitor agencies' activities. While public interest groups and programmers can
at times serve as effective intermediaries between the data and the public, a via-
ble policy of transparency and public accountability cannot depend on such in-
termediaries alone.
Online transparency policies should be more welcoming to broader civil
society. In particular, regulatory information should be provided in plain lan-
guage, within its regulatory context, and in a user-centric manner that would
allow individuals to readily grasp, compare, and evaluate it."' The Obama Ad-
ministration has already begun working in this direction by passing the Plain
Writing Act of 2010.244 A memorandum that offers agencies guidance on im-
plementing the Act defines plain writing as "writing that is clear, concise,
well-organized, and consistent with other best practices appropriate to the sub-
ject or field and intended audience." 45 The memorandum requires agencies to
use plain writing in "every paper or electronic letter, publication, form, notice,
or instruction" and "communicate with the public in a way that is clear, simple,
meaningful, and jargon-free. "246 These prescriptions are intuitive and they
should apply to all information that agencies release to the Internet.
There are at least two possible objections to this proposition. First, citizens,
as opposed to interest groups, may not be interested in regulatory transparency.
They largely lack the motivation, knowledge, expertise, and resources that are
242. As most of this information already exists but is distributed only internally, its
public release should not be overly burdensome from the EPA's perspective.
243. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAvID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 59-65 (2007).
244. Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)).
245. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Admin'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Ap. 13, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/20n/mn-15.pdf
[hereinafter Sunstein Memorandum]. For additional policy suggestions, see
FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 243, at 170-182.
246. Sunstein Memorandum, supra note 245, at 5.
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required to inspect and evaluate agencies' actions. 4 7 Hence, the argument goes,
there is no reason to engage individuals-rather than civil society watchdogs
and interest groups-in the public accountability game. This position is ques-
tionable. While it might have been accurate in the past, the Internet changed
the rules. Even if an online participatory democracy is in the realm of fantasy,
the Internet generates unprecedented opportunities for accessing and sharing
information.4' The design of online transparency policies should therefore al-
low individuals or diffuse public interest groups to take advantage of these op-
portunities and provide meaningful regulatory information in a more contex-
tualized manner. Even if the number of individuals who access or use this
information will remain limited, it may still be a considerable improvement
compared to the pre-Internet age. Moreover, accessible regulatory information
may also generate positive externalities by drawing more citizens into political
affairs and thus enriching the public sphere.
A second problem is that there are multiple incentives to provide the public
with incomplete or even distorted information. This is particularly true when
stakes are high and the manner in which information is framed influences the
popular understanding of regulatory affairs. The advantage of the raw datasets
that are released on Data.gov is that they contain "naked" data, which has not
been subject to manipulation or interpretation. A contextualized account of
administrative processes and performance surely cannot be neutral in the same
manner. But even "naked" datasets can be subject to manipulation as long as
agencies define their scope and form, and thus the problem is not unique to
contextualized information. Moreover, a narrative can be more helpful for
spurring public debate. While there are no complete solutions to this challenge,
the development of uniform standards and templates would be an important
step in the right direction. These mechanisms would meaningfully and accu-
rately capture regulatory decisionmaking processes, thus allowing for a critical
assessment of agencies' performance.
3. Strengthening the Enforcement of Transparency Policies
This Subsection focuses on the enforcement of regulatory transparency pol-
icies and their audience. The mandatory transparency policies surveyed in this
Part demonstrate that agencies are often given wide de jure or de facto discre-
tion to decide what types of information are disclosed to the public. Hence, it is
plausible to assume that even if transparency policies targeted the regulatory
process and performance, agencies would not comply. There can be several ma-
nifestations of such noncompliance. First, agencies may simply ignore the
transparency requirements imposed on them, as happened with E-FOIA.
Second, they may manipulate their transparency obligations, complying only
247. For a comprehensive analysis, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 647 (2011).




formally and revealing meaningless information. This scenario can be particu-
larly worrisome in the case of the suggested process transparency-a mandate
that agencies explain their decisionmaking processes might generate
cookie-cutter formulations that do not reveal much about the actual process.
While these concerns can never be fully abolished, effective enforcement meas-
ures can help mitigate them. Nonetheless, such measures are surprisingly absent
from the existing regulatory transparency policies.
As discussed below, there are several ways to mitigate these enforcement
problems. None of the proposed mechanisms is sufficient as a stand-alone solu-
tion. My goal is merely to suggest a menu of practical tools that can comple-
ment each other in creating meaningful regulatory transparency.
These tools can be divided into three categories. The first category is institu-
tional measures, which include such suggestions as establishing a transparency
oversight commission and taking advantage of federal inspectors general. The
second category is civil society measures, which include suggestions such as en-
couraging public oversight and facilitating public litigation to enforce transpar-
ency requirements. The final category involves incentives, which aimed to per-
suade agencies to comply with transparency requirements through the use of
various sticks and carrots.
Institutional measures. These enforcement mechanisms rely on new or ex-
isting institutional entities that could improve the oversight and implementa-
tion of regulatory transparency.
Establishing an independent oversight commission is one example of such
institutional measures. Congress could create an independent body to monitor
agencies' compliance with transparency requirements and help them imple-
ment their own transparency obligations. Both the White House and Congress
have expressed support for the establishment of a commission that would be
charged with monitoring the implementation of the federal spending transpar-
ency legislation. In an executive order signed in June 2011, President Obama es-
tablished a Government Accountability and Transparency Board, which would
"provide strategic direction for enhancing the transparency of Federal spending
and advance efforts to detect and remediate fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal
programs." 2 49 A similar initiative, the Digital Accountability and Transparency
(DATA) Act, 2 0 has passed the House of Representatives. This legislation would
establish an independent body responsible for monitoring the implementation
of federal spending transparency policies.2 '
249. Exec. Order No. 13,576, 76 Fed. Reg. 116 (June 16, 2011). The Board shall consist of
eleven members of the executive, including agency inspectors general, agency
chief financial officers, and a senior official of the Office of Management and
Budget, and any other members as the President shall designate. Id.
250. H.R. 2146, 112th Cong. (2012).
251. The DATA Act aims to consolidate the information contained on websites such as
Recovery.gov and USAspending.gov, and it would offer a single government-wide
platform for federal spending transparency. For an analysis of the proposed Act
and its problems, see Craig Jennings, DATA Act Would Be a Setback for Spending
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While these two initiatives represent a step in the right direction, they are
quite narrow. Both President Obama's executive order and the DATA Act envi-
sion the commission as a toothless entity. An effective oversight commission
would have measures to discipline agencies that do not comply with transpar-
ency obligations. For example, agencies that fail to comply with transparency
requirements may be fined; the head of the agency may be required to justify
noncompliance; and the internal review of the agency's proposed rules may be
halted. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the commission should not be limited
to federal spending. An effective watchdog commission would need to cover
additional regulatory domains. Such a commission could ensure, for example,
the proper implementation of E-FOIA and oversee the contents of the
Regulations.gov platform. As the primary institution in charge of regulatory
transparency, such an oversight commission could play an important role in
designing nuanced and harmonized transparency policies and help agencies
with their implementation.
A second institutional measure that could strengthen the enforcement of
transparency initiatives is inspectors general (IGs). Over seventy IGs currently
serve in the federal government, and all federal agencies and departments ought
to have at least one. 2 Under the Inspector General Act of 1978," IGs are inde-
pendent government officers who are responsible for the prevention and detec-
tion of fraud, waste, and abuse in their respective agencies. IGs are typically ap-
pointed by the President and approved by the Senate, and are required to report
their findings directly to Congress and agency heads. 254 Because they are "struc-
turally insulated from control by agency heads," IGs are recognized as an effec-
tive check on governmental fraud and mismanagement." As part of their work,
IGs audit and approve financial statements produced by federal agencies."'
These audit and approval functions can be expanded to include a power to
monitor agencies' compliance with transparency obligations. Because IGs are
familiar with the political dynamics of their respective agencies and can moni-
tor their activities from within, they are very well suited to supervise agencies'
implementation of transparency requirements. While a transparency oversight
Transparency, OMB WATCH (June 21, 2011), http://www.ombwatch.org/node
/11734.
252. INSPECTOR GENERAL DIRECTORY, http://www.ignet.gov/igs/homepagel.html (last
visited Oct. 23, 2012); see PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPEC-
TORs GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
253. Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. n1or (1978).
254. For a general discussion of the role of IGs, see Kathryn Newcomer & George Grob,
Federal Offices of Inspector General: Thriving on Chaos? 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN.
235 (2004).
255. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Danger-
ous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2347 (2006).
256. See Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838




commission is an external mechanism that may put agencies in an unfavorable
light, IGs can affect agency behavior internally. Avoiding potential controversy
or critique, they may help administrators allocate resources to the implementa-
tion of their transparency requirements, and thus effectively drive transparency
policies from behind the scenes. As IGs currently invest most of their efforts in
audits, evaluations, and investigations,2 5 7 an additional check on agencies'
implementation of transparency policies would not pose a significant challenge,
and could yield major benefits.
Civil society measures. In addition to the above institutional measures,
well-designed enforcement measures could turn civil society into an important
player in the regulatory compliance game. Two mechanisms that can enhance
the involvement of civil society in the enforcement of transparency policies are
(1) public oversight and reporting of noncompliance and (2) public litigation.
First, public oversight could serve as an effective complement to the trans-
parency oversight commissions and federal IGs suggested above. Rather than
single-handedly monitoring agencies' compliance with transparency obliga-
tions, these entities could open online channels for communication with civil
society and solicit reports of noncompliance. In order to incentivize individuals
to report cases of noncompliance, they could receive a small monetary award
that would originate from the budgets of noncomplying agencies.
As civil society organizations have effectively monitored agencies' transpar-
ency practices for decades,1 the potential for a public-private oversight part-
nership seems particularly attractive. Assuming that the oversight commission
and IGs effectively respond to the reports and take measures against noncom-
plying agencies, civil society groups are likely to take advantage of these chan-
nels and provide helpful and targeted information. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions such as Pro Publica, 0MB Watch, or Sunlight Foundation conduct a
comprehensive analyses of regulatory decisionmaking and monitor agencies'
compliance with transparency obligations. These groups could share the results
of their work with a transparency oversight commission and the IGs, and help
establish a synergic and effective oversight system. I
Public litigation can also be an effective enforcement tool available to civil
society. Under the general standing doctrine, however, the ability of civil society
to redress "generalized grievances" in courts is limited: citizens cannot bring
suits against the federal government "unless a 'concrete' and 'particularized' in-
terest [is] at stake."' 9 Standing to enforce agencies' transparency obligations
may, however, be different. Commentators have interpreted the Supreme Court
decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins"'o to say that "if Congress
257. Newcomer & Grob, supra note 254, at 240-45.
258. For a list of some of these organizations, see supra note 50.
259. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 632-33 (1999) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
260. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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creates a legal right to information and gives people the authority to vindicate
that right in court, the standing question is essentially resolved.""' Hence, by
granting explicit standing rights as part of the transparency legislation (for ex-
ample, E-FOIA, FFATA, or the Recovery Act), Congress could open the door
for members of civil society to enforce agencies' transparency obligations in
courts. Such an approach could remedy, for instance, the massive non-
compliance with E-FOIA, which requires agencies to publish online frequently
requested records."'
Litigation is of course not a panacea to the enforcement of regulatory
transparency. It requires a significant expenditure of resources from both agen-
cies and civil society, and involves a lengthy and often inefficient process. How-
ever, if employed as a matter of last resort-particularly when other enforce-
ment mechanisms fail-it can serve as a valuable sanctioning tool.
Incentives. Aside from institutional and civil society measures, agencies
could also be incentivized to comply with their transparency obligations. An ar-
ray of political, financial, and judicial incentives can be beneficial in this respect.
Political and financial incentives are one option. Federal agencies operate as
a part of the executive branch. They are politically and financially dependent on
Congress and the President."' When leveraged properly, these dependencies
could actually incentivize agencies to comply with transparency obligations.
Both carrots and sticks could be helpful in this respect. Congressional commit-
tees may offer the carrot by conditioning the funding of federal programs on
the fulfillment of transparency obligations. 0MB may slightly increase the
budget of the most transparent agencies or offer their public officials various
political boons. In the alternative, agencies could be threatened with the stick.
They might, for example, be fined for failing to comply with their transparency
obligations. These measures, of course, require political will on the part of Con-
gress and the President. Because that will is frequently missing, judicial incen-
tives may be the more practical solution.
As a complement to these political and financial incentives, judicial incen-
tives might further encourage agencies to meet their transparency obligations.
For instance, courts can take into account agencies' compliance with the rele-
vant transparency policies as part of their judicial review of other regulatory is-
sues. Agencies that prove compliance with transparency requirements would be
261. Sunstein, supra note 259, at 617; see 524 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
within the power of Congress to authorize any interested person to manage
(through the courts) the Executive's enforcement of any law that includes a re-
quirement for the filing and public availability of a piece of paper.").
262. For a discussion of E-FOIA, see supra Subsection II.A.2.
263. For a discussion of congressional and presidential oversight of administrative




granted a more lax judicial review, while nontransparent agencies would be
subject to more stringent judicial scrutiny.6 4
In sum, one of the major reasons for the failure of previous transparency
efforts is the lack of attention to the enforcement of transparency policies. The
bulk of transparency legislation is not accompanied by enforcement measures.
Noncompliance therefore becomes the norm. This Section proposed various
solutions to that problem, including institutional and civil society enforcement
measures and a variety of potential incentives. While none of these suggestions
would be sufficient on its own, a combination of the proposed measures would
surely lead to a more effective regulatory transparency policy.
B. Methods of Holding Agencies Accountable
Public accountability consists of two elements: the agency's explanation of
its decision to the public and a public response to that decision. The previous
Section discussed how agencies could fulfill the explanatory element of public
accountability. The second requirement-public sanctions-is perhaps even
more challenging than the first. Even when process and performance informa-
tion effectively reaches the public sphere, how can civil society use it to hold
agencies accountable? And what is the role of the Internet in the accountability
framework?
The next Subsections discuss two important mechanisms that civil society
can use to hold agencies accountable: judicial oversight and public advocacy.
These Subsections demonstrate that, while the direct access of civil society to
courts is limited, online transparency policies do play an important role in the
public advocacy efforts of civil society.
1. Public Accountability via Litigation
If transparency requirements are robustly enforced, agencies will release a
flood of information in order to avoid sanctions. That information, in turn,
would allow civil society to take an agency to court, trigger judicial oversight,
and force the agency to revisit its decision. As Louis Jaffe has noted, "[T]here is
in our society a profound, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ulti-
mate guardian and assurance of the limits set upon executive power by the con-
stitutions and legislatures.""'
Several federal statutes contain "citizen suit" provisions that authorize any
citizen to challenge agencies' decisions in court. The Clean Air Act' and the
264. This option follows the solution proposed in David Fontana, Reforming the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 81
(2005).
265. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 321 (1965).
266. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012).
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Clean Water Act,267 for example, include provisions that allow "any citizen" to
commence a civil action on her own behalf against administrators who fail to
carry out nondiscretionary statutory obligations. Legislation on motor vehicle
safety, occupational health and safety, and consumer safety similarly allows any
person who may be "adversely affected" by administrative action to file peti-
tions against the responsible agencies.28
An important benefit of citizen suits is that they can reduce the effect of
"agency slack"-underenforcement of statutory requirements because of politi-
cal pressures, regulatory capture, laziness, or the self-interest of regulators."9
Due to the "grave distrust" of agencies' ability to avoid capture by regulated
firms, Congress sought to "reduce administrative discretion and expand public
participation."2 70 Citizen suits were supposed to substitute for agency enforce-
ment if the agency fails to act,"7 or "prod an agency into action," either by pub-
licly "shaming it" or by "forcing it to intervene" and take the lead over the
suit.2 72 Indeed, in the environmental context, citizen suits generated "vigorous
citizen enforcement of environmental laws."' 73
Despite their promising potential, however, citizen suits cannot always be
regarded as an effective vehicle for public accountability. There are several rea-
sons for this. First, litigation requires substantial resources, expertise, and moti-
vation on the part of the party who brings the suit; hence, only a relatively small
number of cases can be brought to courts. Second, even if these challenges are
overcome, the current scope of citizen suits is narrow. Such suits require an ex-
plicit statutory authorization, and, even more importantly, do not automa-
tically grant standing. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held
that "when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substan-
tially more difficult to establish."2 74 As the Lujan Court stressed, the standing
267. Clean Water Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012).
268. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 3o61(a) (2012);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 655 § 6(f) (2012); Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2059 (2012). For a general discussion, see Eliz-
abeth Magill, Standing for the Public A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1185-89
(2009).
269. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement, 91 VA. L. REV.
93, no (2005).
270. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 81, 83 (2002).
271. Magill, supra note 268, at 188.
272. Stephenson, supra note 269, at no.
273. Zinn, supra note 270, at 84.
274. 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of




requirement is grounded on the notion that "[v] indicating the public interest
(including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution
and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.""' Since Lujan,
the Court has frequently "refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of
wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,"' because
they would be "most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.""6
This judicial interpretation of standing requirements has been subject to
substantial criticism.'" Because it largely prevents civil society from accessing
courts on the basis of "generalized grievances," this position erects a substantial
barrier to public accountability.
2. Public Accountability via Public Advocacy
Because civil society's access to courts is limited, public advocacy becomes
the major vehicle for public accountability. Under this framework, citizens do
not turn to the judiciary in order to hold agencies accountable for their deci-
sions, but rather avail themselves of other channels of influence. Two major
channels are publicly "naming and shaming" agencies in hopes of changing
their behavior, and taking advantage of the capacities of other political institu-
tions (i.e., the President and Congress).
Effective transparency policies have always been a prerequisite for the sus-
tainable success of such advocacy efforts. The role of online transparency poli-
cies in this framework is twofold: making relevant information easily accessible
to civil society and effectively disseminating the message on regulatory misbe-
havior to the media or other political institutions. The discussion that follows
elaborates on these mechanisms.
The media is probably the most common mechanism of public advocacy.
Indeed, the role of the media as the ultimate watchdog of executive power is
central to any functioning democracy. Before the Internet, this role was largely
reserved to the "mainstream" media. Critical coverage of a malfunctioning reg-
ulatory policy in an influential newspaper or on popular television could exert
stein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REv. 163, 183-93, 202-06 (1992).
275. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. The main rationale of this decision was that unfettered
standing rights would "turn the judges into overseers, and usurpers, of the Presi-
dent himself." Sunstein, supra note 274, at 201.
276. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500
(1975)). For an analysis of the "pro-democracy" function of standing and the
Court's reluctance to pursue it, see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61
STAN. L. REV. 459, 475-492 (2008). For an analysis of the reasons that led the
Court to take this approach, see Magill, supra note 268, at 1195-98.
277. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984); Magill, supra note
268, at 1183; Sunstein, supra note 274, at 202-23.
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pressure and compel agencies to change their course of action. These hubs of
influence were very limited, as only a small number of civil society players had
access to them.27
The Internet has changed this distribution of power, multiplying and am-
plifying potential hubs of influence and pressure.2 79 It has generated a new
"networked public sphere," allowing "individuals and groups of intense politi-
cal engagement to report, comment, and generally play the role traditionally as-
signed to the press in observing, analyzing, and creating political salience for
matters of public interest.""2o In the context of regulatory information, politi-
cally motivated individuals or diffuse groups with shared political interests can
collaborate. They could analyze the online data released by agencies, flag issues
of concern, and disseminate their findings via a range of media platforms-
from social networks and private blogs to widely read blogs and mainstream
media.28 1
The example of Wikileaks demonstrates how a small online organization
can acquire global influence by choosing an effective strategy for collecting and
disseminating information."' Social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter,
allow individuals and organizations to amplify their messages, mobilizing and
engaging wide constituencies as part of effective public advocacy campaigns.
Collaborative journalistic platforms, such as The Huffington Post, expand the
traditional boundaries of reporting and journalism.8 3 Technological platforms
developed by organizations such as the Sunlight Foundation in the United
States or MySociety in the United Kingdom allow citizens to play a more active
role in monitoring and analyzing political events.284 Naturally, the initiation of
an online debate on a problematic regulatory matter cannot guarantee a regula-
278. See generally BENKLER, supra note 60, at 176-211 (discussing the fundamental and
constitutive role that mass media has played in liberal democracies and the demo-
cratic critique of mass media).
279. For an overview of the new media landscape, dubbed the "emerging networked
fourth estate," see Benkler, supra note 178, at 376-79.
280. BENKLER, supra note 60, at 220. Some commentators have lamented that these
new hubs of influence are not as democratizing as originally envisioned. See, e.g.,
MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2009) (arguing that
traditional elites still play key roles in the networked public sphere). However,
there is no doubt that technology improves the ability of civil society to take part
in public policy debates.
281. While not all of these voices are heard, "clusters of moderately read sites provide
platforms for vastly greater numbers of speakers than were heard in the
mass-media environment." BENKLER, supra note 60, at 242.
282. See Benkler, supra note 178, at 315-30.
283. See id. at 377.
284. See, e.g., Projects, MYSOCIETY, http://www.mysociety.org/projects (last visited Oct.
23, 2012); SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, http://www.sunlightfoundation.com (last vi-
sited Oct. 23, 2012).
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tory response, much less a policy change. However, the availability and accessi-
bility of these pressure points are central for democracy.8 5
The availability of meaningful online information on agencies' decision-
making processes and performance can allow diverse members of civil society
to cooperate on issues of mutual concern.2" By sending a message about ad-
ministrative misbehavior into the networked public sphere, members of civil
society exert public pressure on agencies, with the hope to name and shame an
agency into changing its behavior and satisfy the punitive element of public ac-
countability.8 7
While naming and shaming would not necessarily lead to meaningful poli-
cy changes, a more institutionalized approach to public advocacy is also avail-
able. Such advocacy efforts can rely on established oversight bodies, such as the
President and Congress. Both the President and Congress possess substantial
oversight authority over agencies' actions. The bulk of presidential oversight"'
is executed through 0MB, which was authorized by President Reagan in 1981 to
review administrative rulemaking and facilitate coordination among agen-
285. For a more detailed discussion of the viral effects generated by old and new me-
dia, see Archon Fung & Jennifer Shkabatur, Viral Engagement: Fast, Cheap and
Broad, but Good for Democracy? (Dec. 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
286. See, e.g., Bruce Bimber et al., Technological Change and the Shifting Nature of Polit-
ical Organization, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNET POLITICS 72, 72 (Andrew Chadwick
& Philip N. Howard eds., 2009) (discussing "ways in which new communication
technologies enable the development of a diverse array of organizational forms in
the pursuit of collective interests" (emphasis omitted)).
287. A possible example of this scenario is the scandal that involved the expenses of
British Members of Parliament (MPs). Transparency advocates used the British
Freedom of Information Act to request information about the discretionary ex-
penses of MPs. The requests were at first declined but eventually the information
was released and published by the Daily Telegraph. The publications "exposed sys-
tematic abuse by MPs from across the political divide, ranging from fraud to fri-
volous or grandiose claims, symbolized by claiming costs of biscuits and moat
cleaning." Robert Hazell et al., Open House? Freedom of Information and Its Impact
on the UK Parliament, 90 PUB. ADMIN. 1, 14 (2012). These publications had a wa-
tershed effect on British politics, leading to the resignation of high-level public of-
ficials and the establishment of the Independent Standards Authority-an inde-
pendent commission that is now in charge of paying MP salaries and expenses. Id.
288. In recent decades, the presidential model has become the dominant approach to
agencies' oversight. David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal
Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2199 (2010). For an
overview and a critical account of this approach, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260
(2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administra-
tive State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV.
47 (20o6).
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cies."9 Operating as part of OMB, the Office for Information and Regulatory
Affairs reviews preliminary regulatory plans submitted by agencies as a precon-
dition for their implementation. This form of review offers the President a con-
venient vehicle to enforce his policy preferences and restrain "overzealous bu-
reaucrats bent on promoting their agencies' narrow agendas." 9 o
Congressional oversight of administrative agencies is similarly thorough.
The Congressional Review Act2 9' requires agencies to submit all final rules for
review by Congress and the congressional "investigative arm"-the GAO-
before they can take effect.29 2 Aside from reviewing final rules, the GAO also
studies the general performance of the executive branch and investigates poten-
tial cases of waste, fraud, and abuse by federal agencies. 93 This oversight system
is complemented by a wide array of professionally staffed committees in both
the House and the Senate, which make it "very easy for members of Congress
with an interest in a particular agency to assume an oversight function." 94 The
monitoring activities of these committees typically involve hearings in which
administrators are required to explain the performance of their agencies. 95
These interactions often result in "tacit agreements between committees and
agencies" that require agencies to commit to a certain course of action.296
The Internet can play a key role in this respect by facilitating communica-
tion and cooperation between civil society groups and political oversight bo-
dies. Although most congressional committees and the OMB have contact in-
formation on their websites, they currently do not solicit public input into
issues that may require further scrutiny or investigation. This should be
289. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (Feb. 17, 1981); see also Richard
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 11-16 (1995) (noting that the review process of the OMB "has become a perma-
nent part of the institutional design of American government").
290. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 288, at 1261; Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 288,
at 50.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 801-808 (2012).
292. Id. § 8oi(a)(1)(A)-(B). In principle, Congress can pass a joint resolution that dis-
approves of the rule upon review and thereby annuls it. Id. § 802(a). The use of
this procedure is rare. See Beermann, supra note 231, at 84; Rubenstein, supra note
288, at 2210.
293. Beermann, supra note 231, at 129. The GAO states on its website that it made 2,132
recommendations in fiscal year 2011 to improve government operations. Eighty
percent of recommendations made five years prior had been implemented by
2011. See GAO at a Glance, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/gglance.html (last vi-
sited Oct. 23, 2012).
294. Beermann, supra note 231, at 122-23; see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2257-60 (2001).





changed. With the help of technology, civil society could take advantage of the
mechanisms of presidential and congressional oversight in order to hold agen-
cies accountable. Relying on online information released by agencies, civil so-
ciety could assist political oversight bodies by triggering a "fire alarm"-
drawing their attention to socially pertinent and problematic regulatory matters
that might have been overlooked. 9 7
Easily accessible online channels of communication complemented by
presidential or congressional oversight bodies can motivate politically engaged
individuals to monitor agencies on the basis of the information agencies dis-
close, and help presidential and congressional bodies in their own oversight en-
deavors.298
Although existing online transparency policies have largely failed to achieve
their goals, a few simple reforms would allow these policies to begin playing an
important role in ensuring the accountability of administrative agencies.
This Part began the development of the appropriate design of these re-
forms. First, I examined the optimal scope of online transparency policies. I
suggested that transparency policies should cover two categories of informa-
tion: the decisionmaking processes of agencies and their performance. Further,
I argued that although public interest organizations are the most likely moni-
tors of administrative agencies, online transparency policies should be designed
in a way that lowers access and participation barriers for individual citizens and
diffuse social groups. Lastly, I discussed how to improve the enforcement of on-
line transparency policies by using a range of institutional and civil society
monitoring instruments.
Second, this Part examined the mechanisms available to civil society to
hold agencies accountable. In some cases, public interest groups or politically
engaged members of civil society can file citizen suits in order to challenge
agencies' actions in court. This option, however, is limited by the restrictive
297. The fire alarm metaphor refers to the seminal article by McCubbins & Schwartz,
who argued that there are two major techniques for political oversight of adminis-
trative agencies: police patrol and fire alarms. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28
AM. J. POL. Sci. 165, 166 (1984). The police patrols analogy stands for a "centra-
lized, active, and direct" form of oversight, by which Congress proactively moni-
tors agencies, aiming to detect and remedy possible statutory violations. Id. The
fire alarm oversight, in contrast, is responsive rather than proactive: "Instead of
sniffing for fires, Congress places fire-alarm boxes on street corners ... and some-
times dispatches its own hook-and-ladder in response to an alarm." Id. Fire
alarms are thus sounded by affected stakeholders in order to trigger formal inves-
tigations or political counteraction in response to agencies' activities.
298. Naturally, in some cases these bodies do not intervene in problematic regulatory
decisions because they lack political will, and not because they have overlooked
these decisions. In such cases, public advocacy efforts should concentrate on the
media.
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standing doctrine. A more viable possibility is to trigger "fire alarms" or to
compel the legislative and executive branches to activate their own oversight
mechanisms. While the concept of fire alarms has been recognized for decades,
the Internet can make these alarms more effective by engaging many more pub-
lic monitors and by generating improved channels of communication and co-
operation with congressional and presidential oversight bodies.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory transparency is traditionally regarded as the primary means for
strengthening the public accountability of administrative agencies. Nonetheless,
the effectiveness of transparency policies is often undermined by agencies' resis-
tance to public exposure and by their lack of public engagement. The introduc-
tion of technology into regulatory transparency policies has been envisioned as
a powerful game-changer that could overcome these past hurdles. This Article
challenges this common perspective, complicating the links between transpar-
ency, technology, and public accountability.
This Article demonstrates that the existing policies of online transparency
are largely developed for the sake of public accountability, but fail to achieve it.
In some cases, appropriate transparency requirements exist but are not en-
forced. In other instances, transparency policies allow agencies considerable
discretion to decide which information will be disclosed. In still other cases,
transparency policies target information that is irrelevant for purposes of public
accountability. To realize the unfulfilled potential of open government, an al-
ternative regulatory regime is required.
This Article proposes such a regime, advocating for process and perfor-
mance transparency and articulating improved enforcement measures. The im-
plementation of these suggestions would likely improve agencies' accountability
to the public, but could also entail some social costs. If the suggested measures
are too burdensome to implement within the existing political system, the ac-
countability rhetoric of regulatory transparency should be abandoned. Instead
of introducing ambitious policies that consistently fail to achieve public ac-
countability, transparency policies should openly target other objectives.
However, as long as regulatory transparency policies declare that public
accountability is their ultimate objective, the current means are inappropriate
to the ends.
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